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THE ECONOMICS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF 
CONVERTIBLE BONDS 
WILLIAM W. BRATTON, JR.* 
Professor Bratton examines judicial regulation of issuer-bondholder 
conflicts of interest within three different, but closely related doctrinal 
frameworks: neoclassical contract interpretation; contract avoidance; and 
corporate law fiduciary restraint. After discussing the elements of convertible 
bond valuation and their interaction with issuer actions giving rise to conflicts of 
interest, he evaluates the case for judicial intervention to protect bondholder 
interests. He concludes that ·bondholder protective intervention is fair and 
tolerably efficient, provided it is kept within the bounds of contract 
interpretation. But he finds that more aggressive judicial intervention under the 
frameworks of contract avoidance and fiduciary restraint carries an unnecessary 
risk of causing substantial costs in the marketplace. Thus, he advocates that 
intervention under the latter two approaches be avoided. 
INTRODUCTION 
The stockholder-bondholder relationship is one of debtor to 
creditor, and is pervaded by conflicting interests.1 The management 
of a corporation with outstanding bonds2 can take any number of 
* Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva 
University; A.B., 1973, J.D., 1976, Columbia University. A number of colleagues, including 
David Carlson, Arthur Jacobson, Paul Shupack a;1d Eliiott Weiss, provided helpful 
comments and criticism. 
1. "Conflicting interests" here mean conflicts between the self interest of an indi­
vidual or legal entity and its legal or moral obligations to others. See Anderson, Conflicts of 
Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 738, 738 & n.l 
(1978). 
2. A "bond" is a long term promissory note issued pursuant to a trust indenture-­
the "bond contract" referred to in the text of this Article. A "trust indenture" i,.<; a contract 
entered into between the corporation issuing the bonds and a trustee for the benefit of the 
holders of the bonds. It delineates the rights of the bondholders and the is.<>uer. It sets f orth the 
mechanics of payment, states the issuer's sinking ftL'ld obligations and redemption rights, 
regulates the conduct of the issuer's business, and defines events of default and the role of the 
trustee. See 1 A. DEWING, THE FINANCiAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 173-74 (5th ed. 1953). 
By channelling the administration and enforcement of all these contract provisions through a 
single party, the indenture trustee, the trust indenture makes it feasible to borrow small 
amounts of money on a long term basis from large numbers of lenders on identicai terms. See 
V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPOR.ATE FINANCE 83 (2d ed. 1979). 
In referring to all promissory notes issued pursuant to trust indentures as "bonds," this 
Article ignores a nicety of corporate practice--the distinction between "debentures," un­
secured long term notes issued pursuant to trust indentures, and "bonds," long-term notes 
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actions that benefit the stockholders at the bondholders' expense, 
even assuming no present prospect of a payment default. Consider, 
for example, a bond issuer that increases its dividend rate and con­
comitantly decreases the rate at which it reinvests earnings. This 
increases the risk of nonpayment of the bonds and, given a fixed in­
terest rate, reduces their value without necessarily reducing the 
value of the stockholders' participation in the issuer. A similar effect 
might result if the issuer incurred additional debt or substituted 
riskier assets for existing ones. 3 
Courts traditionally have directed bondholders to protect 
themselves against such self-interested issuer action with explicit 
contractual provisions. Holders of senior securities, such as bonds, 
are outside the legal model of the firm for protective purposes: a 
heavy black-letter line bars the extension of corporate fiduciary pro­
tections to them.4 On the contract law side of the black letter line, 
judicial response to bondholder requests for protection has been 
issued pursuant to trust indentures and secured by a lien on some or all of the issuer's assets. 
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, CORPORATE DEBT FINANCING PROJECT, COMMENTARIES ON 
MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVISIONS, 1965, MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVI­
SIONS ALL REGISTERED ISSUES, 1967, AND CERTAIN NEGOTIABLE PROVISIONS WHICH MAY BE 
INCLUDED IN A PARTICULAR INCORPORATING INDENTURE 7 n.3 (1971) [hereinafter cited as A BF 
CoMMENTARIES] . Most convertible bonds in fact are denominated "convertible debentures." 
This Article uses "bond" in accord with its broader usage as the term for all  long term 
debt securities. 
3. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 334-37 ( 1976). 
Stockholder wealth is maximized if the issuer distributes to the stockholders all capital 
which the issuer cannot invest for a rate of return higher than that available to the stockhold­
ers elsewhere. Such a distribution might take any one of a number of forms-an ordinary cash 
dividend, a spin-off or other distribution in kind, or a payment in connection with a redemp­
tion or other repurchase of outstanding shares. In contrast, the issuer maximizes bondholder 
wealth if it retains all earnings and other capital which it can reinvest for a positive return. 
Distributions to stockholders are not in the bondholders' interest because any decrease in the 
value of the issuer's assets increases the likelihood of default on the bonds. See Smith & 
Warner, On Financial Contracting, An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. EcoN. 1 17, 121  
( 1 979).  
Stockholder-bondholder conflict has been particularly acute where issuers have under­
gone fundamental corporate changes. Long term bondholders whose interests have depreci­
ated due to rising interest rates seek recovery of face value and seize on any pretext to force 
acceleration of their bonds. Conversely, rising interest rates give issuers an enhanced interest 
in keeping old, low interest bond issues locked into their capital structures. See, e.g., Sharon 
Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,  521 F. Supp. 1 04, 118  (S.D.N.Y. 1 98 1 ), aff'd in 
part and rev'd in part, 691 F.2d 1 039 ( 2d Cir. 1 982), cert. denied,_ U.S._, 1 03 S.Ct. 1 253 
( 1 983) ( sale of substantially all the assets and liquidation of an issuer of bonds) .  
4.  The line, while remaining substantially i n  place against holders o f  debt securi­
ties, has been breached to protect preferred stockholders. See, e.g., Bove v. Community Hotel 
Corp., 105 R.I. 36, 249 A.2d 89 ( 1969) ( acknowledging possibility of equitable intervention 
against unfair treatment of preferred stockholders in merger) . But see Guttman v. Illinois 
Central R.R., 189 F.2d 927, 930 ( 2d Cir. ) ,  cert. denied, 342 U.S. 867 ( 195 1 ) .  
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shaped by the traditional ethic of creditor self-protection. The 
"classical" contract law view that the promisee bears the burden of 
obtaining explicit contractual protection has dominated. 5 Protec­
tive doctrines from "neoclassical" contract law have rarely found a 
place in judicial decisions. 6 
This Article takes a new look at judicial regulation of conflicts 
between corporate debt and equity interests in the limited context of 
the convertible bond relationship. Convertible bonds-bonds incor­
porating the privilege of conversion 7 into common stock or other 
securities of the issuer-combine debt and equity features in a single 
hybrid security. Convertibles reduce conflict between stockholders 
and bondholders by creating a class of securityholders whose inter­
ests go to both sides of the debt-equity line. Consider an issuer that 
revamps its business so as to increase the value of its equity at the 
expense of a class of straight bondholders. This result still obtains if 
convertibles are outstanding, but now the action also increases the 
value of the conversion privilege8 -a result not in the stockholders' 
interest. 9 Even so, convertibles do not eliminate all incentives for 
5. See, e.g., Wolfensohn v. Madison Fund, Inc., 253 A.2d 72 (Del. 1969); Briggs v. 
Southern Bakeries Co., 227 Ga. 663, 182 S.E.2d 459 (1971). 
Only when a corporation's business affairs have deteriorated so far as to make fraudu­
lent conveyance doctrine applicable does the law directly protect creditors' interests. For the 
leading discussion of fraudulent conveyance doctrine in the corporate context see Clark, The 
Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1977). 
6. Instead, "business covenants" in standard form bond contracts have been the 
predominant means of protecting bondholder interests. 
7. "Conversion" is the act of exchanging one class of securities for another. The 
conversion right is created by a contract between the issuer and holder, and the exchange is 
effected by a surrender of the original security and the issuance to the holder of a new security 
in its place. See Hills, Convertible Securities-Legal Aspects and Draftsmanship, 19 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (1930). See also Buxbaum, Preferred Stock-Law and Draftsmanship, 42 CALIF. L. 
REV. 243, 279 (1954); Fleischer & Cary, The Taxation of Convertible Bonds and Stock, 74 HARV. 
L. REV. 473 (1961). Denomination of conversion as a "privilege" rather than as a "right" is 
both customary, see Justice Field's opinion in Hotchkiss v. National Banks, 88 U.S. (21 
Wall.) 354, 357 (1874), and juridically accurate. See Berle, Convertible Bonds and Stock 
Purchase Warrants, 36 YALE L.J. 649 (1927). 
As a contractual device, conversion remains subject both to business exigencies and the 
ingenuity of the subsequent drafter. Bonds and preferred stock are not the only securities to 
which a conversion privilege may be attached and common stock is not the only available 
underlying security. Bonds can be made convertible into preferred stock of the issuer or com­
mon stock of a subsidiary or sister corporation; junior debt or preferred stock can be made 
:!onvertible upward into an issue of senior debt. Conversion need not necessarily be optional 
with the holder; bonds convertible at the option of the issuer have appeared in the past. See B. 
GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS 618 (4th ed. 1962); Hills, supra, at 2; 
Kaplan, Piercing the Corporate Boilerplate: Anti-Dilution Clauses in Convertible Securities, 33 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1965). 
8. See infra notes 18-37 and accompanying text. 
9. This diminution in the scope of stockholder-bondholder conflict reduces the 
agency costs of the debt portion of the issue causing a lower interest rate and thus making the 
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issuer action in derogation of bondholder interests. They may even 
create new incentives for issuers to take actions that benefit stock­
holders by diluting or destroying the bondholders' claim on issuer 
equity. The legal status of these special convertible bond conflicts is 
the central concern of this Article. 
A longstanding judicial consensus on the treatment of these 
convertible bond conflicts disintegrated recently. The traditional 
and still widely followed approach turns on the characterization of 
convertibles as being wholly "debt" as opposed to being "equity. "  
This "debt" or "equity" stage of analysis facilitates instant catego­
rization of convertibles inside existing structures of legal doctrine. It  
recurs under the various doctrinal regimes applicable to corporate 
securities despite its denial of the convertible's essentially hybrid 
nature. Whether the characterization turns out to be "debt" or 
"equity" depends on the particular context.10 The "debt" charac­
terization traditional in corporate conflicts of interest rationalizes 
the court's refusal to intervene: being an incident of "debt ,"  the con­
version privilege creates a wholly "contractual" interest in the is­
suer; not being "equity" it does not bridge the black letter line sepa­
rating bondholders from corporate fiduciary protections. 11 As with 
straight bonds, bondholder protection has come from elaborate con­
tractual provisions, such as the "anti-dilution" provisions custom­
ary in convertible bond contracts. 
Recently, a number of courts have characterized convertibles as 
"equity" 1 2 and have applied a range of protective devices. These 
debt portion cheaper from the issuer's point of view. Convertible bondholders, then, are not 
necessarily irrational when they simultaneously accept a lower interest rate and relaxed con­
tractual restrictions on self-interested issuer conduct. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 3, at 
353-54; Smith & Warner, supra note 3. at 141-42. 
10. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.385-4(a) (1983) with Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(a) (1983) 
(both debt and equity for tax purposes). See also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(ll) (1982) (equity for 
federal securities law purposes); Klapmeier v. Flagg, 677 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1982) (convertible 
bonds issued to insider in exchange for promissory note of issuer held to be debt for purposes of 
§ 68 of the old Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1976) (repealed by Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 11 
U.S.C. § 553 (1982)). In re Will of Migel, 71 Misc. 2d 640, 336 N.Y.S.2d 376 (Sup. Ct. 1972) 
(debt for restriction on executor acting under investment provisions of will); AccOUNTING 
PRINCIPLES BOARD, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIF1ED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, EARNINGS 
PER SHARE §§ 15, 31 (1969) (APB Op. No. 15) (accountants treat them as equity, at least for 
purposes of earnings reports). 
11. See, e.g., Kessler v. General Cable Corp., 92 Cal. App. 3d 531, 539-40, 155 Cal. 
Rptr. 94, 103 (1979); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 219 (Del. Ch. 1 974) , rev'd on other 
grounds, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975). See also Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 
194, 200 (1942) (warrants). 
Commentators have questioned the characterization. See Berle, supra note 7, at 654-56; 
Klein, The Convertible Bond: A Peculiar Package, 123 U. PA. L REV. 547, 566-67 (1975). 
12. Compare Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimon: & 0. R.R., 680 F.2d 933, 941 
(3d Cir. 1982) (plmality opinion of Gibbons, .J.), cert. denied, __ U.S._, 103 S.Ct. 475 
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opinions draw on the contractual duty of good faith to support ex­
pansive bondholder-protective contract interpretations. Where ex­
plicit bond contract provisions have blocked bondholder-protective 
constructions, some courts have gone a step further to draw on doc­
trines for avoiding harsh provisions and restraining oppressive exer­
cises of contract rights. Finally, some opinions cross the black letter 
line into corporate territory to assert that issuers and those who con­
trol them owe fiduciary duties to convertible bondholders. 13 
This breakdown of the rigid debt-equity distinction, duly ac­
companied by pointed dissents, has taken place in the federal courts 
of appeals. A panel of the Second Circuit drove the entering wedge in 
1975 in Van Gemert v. Boeing Co. ( Van Gemert I) . 1 4 Although agree­
ing on a bondholder-protective result,  the panel disagreed on 
whether contract law avoidance doctrines or corporate law fiduciary 
duties provided the more appropriate means to achieve it. In Broad 
v. Rockwell International Corp. (Broad I), 1 5  a panel of the Fifth Cir­
cuit picked up and expanded upon the Second Circuit's protective 
lead, bringing to bear all available tools----eontract interpretation, 
restraints on the exercise of contract rights, and corporate fiduciary 
duties. On rehearing en bane ("Broad II"), however, the Fifth Cir­
cuit rejected the panel opinion on every point and reinstated the 
traditional strict contract positions. 1 6 More recently, the Third Cir­
cuit dissonantly raised its voice on the matter in Pittsburgh Terminal 
Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. 1 7  
This Article discards conclusory "debt" or "equity" analysis 
and considers anew the case for going beyond the express provisions 
of the bond contract to protect the interests of convertible bond­
holders when they conflict with stockholder interests. It asks two 
questions: first, whether there is reason to believe that issuers un­
fairly advance stockholder interests at convertible bondholders' ex-
(1983) (equity), with Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 940-41 (5th Cir.) (en bane), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981) (debt). Green v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., No. 76 Civ. 5433, slip 
op. at 17 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1981), splits the difference, calling for contract treatment where 
the wrong alleged goes to the debt aspects of the convertible bond and for corporate law treat­
ment where the wrong alleged impinges upon equity aspects of the bond. 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 186-206. 
14. 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975). 
15. 614 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated, 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981). 
16. 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981). 
17. 680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, _ U.S._, 103 S.Ct. 475 (1983). 
Sitting en bane, the same court again split in a related case, Lowry v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 711 
F.2d 1207 (3d Cir.), (en bane), cert. denied, _ U.S._, 104 S.Ct. 238 (1983). See aLso Kusner 
v. First Pa. Corp., 531 F.2d 1234 (3d Cir. 1976) (convertibles in the context of disclosure 
requirements under the federal securities laws). 
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pense; and second, whether the doctrinal dichotomy-corporate law 
for stockholders and contract law for bondholders-continues to be 
a justifiable part of our system of securities regulation. It answers 
both questions in the affirmative. 
Part I of this Article provides a detailed background picture of 
the convertible bond relationship . Part I I  examines the fairness 
question and concludes that much self-interested issuer conduct 
against convertible bondholders is unfair, albeit not especially so, 
and that judicial intervention against it would cause no significant 
economic harm. The Article shows that neoclassical contract theory 
provides ready doctrinal justification for such intervention, at least 
so long as the risk of the issuer conduct has not clearly been allocated 
to the bondholders by the bond contract. 
Part I I I  examines the question of whether the doctrinal dichot­
omy is justified. It finds a weakening of the assumptions on which 
the doctrinal dichotomy is based, but shows that the conventional 
corporate law model of fiduciary duty is ill suited to the relations of 
issuers and convertible bondholders. Thus the Article concludes 
that the doctrinal dichotomy serves a useful function and should be 
accorded continued, albeit qualified , respect. 
I .  THE CONVERSION PRIVILEGE--VALUATION AND VULNERABILITY 
The bondholder case against self-interested issuer action rests 
on two assertions; first, that the action transfers value from the 
bondholders to the stockholders; and second, that the bondholders 
cannot fairly be deemed to have assumed the risk of the transfer. 
Evaluation of these assertions requires a grasp of the complicated 
economic and legal und erpinnings of the convertib l e  b on d  
relationship. 
A. Valuation-The Economic Background 
Convertible bond valuation is a complicated matter involving a 
large set of stochastically related variables. The following simplified 
model identifies the most significant variables and some of their ba­
sic interrelationships. It focuses most closely on the elements of the 
value of the conversion premium, paying particular attention to the 
variable of issuer call rights. Call rights bear significantly on the val­
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1. PRINCIPAL VARIABLES 
The issuer incorporating a conversion privilege into its bonds 
grants a future claim on its equity. For investors, this future claim 
gives convertible bonds the advantage of combining desirable fea­
tures of straight bonds, such as fixed income payments and principal 
repayment, with the upside potential of common stock. 1 8  In ex­
change for the future equity claim, bondholders customarily accept 
a coupon rate lower than that of an equivalent straight bond, 1 9 less 
restrictive business covenants, and subordinated status. To issuers, 
these concessions give convertibles advantages over straight debt, 
such as cost savings, increased future capacity to incur senior debt, 
and greater flexibility to advance the interests of the common stock­
holders. 2 0 The value of the conversion privilege stems from these 
mutual perceptions of advantage. 
The following Figure2 1 illustrates the upside and downside in­
terrelations of the three constituent elements of value--debt value, 
conversion value, and conversion premium-for a typical converti-
18. Convertible bonds tend to be used during periods of rising stock prices. They 
found favor in the 1920's, see Garner & Forsythe, Stock Purchaser Warrants and "Rights", 4 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 269 ( 1931 ); Keith, Convertible Securities arui Stock Purchase Warrants, 2 ROCKY 
MTN. L. REV. 16, 17 (1929) ,  and again after World War I I ,  see Kaplan, supra note 7, at 2 n.3. 
Convertibles fell out of favor with bear markets of the 1970's, see Soldofsky, The Risk-Return 
Performance of Convertibles, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Winter 1981 ,  at 80-82, but renewed interest 
came with the bull market of 1982, see Bettner, Convertible Bonds May Be Right For The Time 
But Do Some Figuring Before You Buy Them, Wall St. J., Dec. 1 3, 1982, at 56, col. 1 .  
19.  For the past few years, 300 basis points has been the rule o f  thumb on the cou­
pon rate differential. See Soldofsky, supra note 18,  at 81 .  
20. See J.  WESTON & E. BRIGHA..'d, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGERIAL FINANCE 592-93 
(5th ed. 1979); Fleischer & Cary, supra note 7, at 474-75; Reiling, Warrants in Bond- Warrant 
Units: A Survey and Assessment, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1411 ,  1419-20, 1424-25 ( 1972).  
Surveys of  issuers' motivations for using convertibles are numerous. See C .  PILCHER, 
RAISING CAPITAL WITH CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES 22 (1955) (survey of 1948-52 industrial is­
sues; 83% of issuers sought delayed equity financing ) ;  Brigham, An Analysis of Convertible 
Debentures: Theory and Some Empirical Evidence, 21 J. FIN. 35, 50 (1966) (survey of 1961-63 
issues; 73% of issuers sought delayed equity financing, 27% sought reduced interest costs); 
Broman, The Use of Convertible Subordinated Debentures by Industrial Firms 1949-59, Q. REV. 
EcoN. & Bus., Spring 1963, at 65 (survey of 1 949-59 issues; delayed equity financing motiva­
tion dominated) ;  Hoffmeister, Use of Convertible Debt in the Early 1970s: A Reevaluation of 
Corporate Motives, Q. REV. EcoN. & Bus.,  Summer 1977, at 23, 26 (survey of 1970-72 issues; 
34% of issuers primarily sought delayed equity financing, 30% sought reduced interest costs). 
21 .  Some of the slopes of the curve graphed in the Figure are derived from converti­
ble bond valuation curves plotted by the economists Brennan and Schwartz. See Brennan & 
Schwartz, Analyzing Convertible Bonds, 15 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 907, 918-23 
(1980 ) [hereinafter cited as B rennan & Schwartz, Analyzing Convertibles]; Brennan & 
Schwartz, Convertible Bonds: Valuation and Optimal Strategies for Call and Convers1:on, 32 J. 
FIN. 1699, 1710-14 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brennan & Schwartz, Convertible Valuation] . 
Also, the presentation in the Figure was influenced by the graph in R. HIGGINS, FiNANCIAL 
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ble bond 22  at various possible values of the issuing corporation. 23 
22. The bond has a 20 year term. Conversion is optional with the holder at any time 
over the entire term of the bond. The issuer may redeem the bond for its face value plus a small 
premium at any time during the term. The coupon rate is 300 basis points below the rate 
available on a comparable nonconvertible bond. 
23. Theoretical option valuation models have been applied to convertible bonds. 
Only the nature of the variables identified in this body of scholarship need be noted for pur­
poses of this article. 
The seminal, theoretical article is Black & Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate 
Liabilities, 81 J. PoL. EcoN. 637 (1973), which sets forth an equilibrium pricing model for put 
and call options grounded in stochastic calculus. See also Cox, Ross & Rubinstein, Option 
Pricing: A Simplified Approach, 7 J. FIN.  EcoN. 229, 229-30 (19
'
79); Smith, Option Pricing, 3 
J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1976). 
The model is applied to the problem of convertible bond valuation in Brennan & 
Schwartz, Analyzing Convertibles, supra note 21; Brennan & Schwartz, Convertible Valuation, 
supra note 21; Ingersoll, A Contingent-Claims Valuation of Convertible Securities, 4 J. FIN. 
EcoN. 289 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Ingersoll, Contingent Claims]. This work supersedes a 
series of earlier convertible valuation models. The earlier models valued convertibles at the 
greater of debt or conversion value at some future point and discounted that amount to 
present value. For sophisticated examples, see Jennings, An Estimate of Convertible Bond Pre-
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Debt value24 is the value of an equivalent straight bond with the 
same coupon rate. It is sensitive to the variables dominant in 
straight bond valuation, such as interest rate levels and the issuer's 
equity cushion. Conversion value is the value of the amount of com­
mon stock into which the bond can be converted . It depends on the 
market value of the underlying common stock and the price, the 
"conversion price," at which the bonds, taken at their face value, 
are convertible. 2 5  If the conversion price is a constant, conversion 
value is subject to the same determinants as the stock price, and 
goes up and down in lockstep with it. Although arbitrage possibili­
ties prevent the bond from selling below the lower of debt or conver­
sion value, 26 nothing prevents it from selling above the higher of 
these two values. Conversion premium is the amount by which mar­
ket value exceeds debt or conversion value. 2 7 If we characterize the 
conversion privilege as a long term option 28 on the underlying com­
mon, the premium represents the option's value. 
Assume that the bond illustrated in the Figure is priced, issued 
and sold for its $1000 face value with a conversion price of $50. As-
mium, 9 J. FIN. & quANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 33 ( 1 974); Walter & Que, The Valuation of Con­
vertible Bonds, 28 J. FIN. 713 ( 1973 ) ;  and Weil, Segall & Green, Premiums on Convertible 
Bonds, 23 J. FIN. 445 ( 1968). For a simplified exposition under the old model, see J. WESTON & 
E. BRIGHAM, supra note 20 , at 593-601. 
As applied by Ingersoll, and by Brennan and Schwartz, the contingent claims model 
refines but in no sense refutes the valuation relationships derived from intuition and casual 
empiricism, illustrated in the Figure. See Brennan & Schwartz, Convertible Valuation, supra 
note 21 ,  at 1710. 
24. The term "debt value" is unique to this Article and is employed for reasons of 
clarity. "Bond value" is the customary term. 
25. Commonly set 10 to 20% above the market price of the underlying common 
stock at the time of issue, conversion price may remain constant for the life of the conversion 
privilege, see Soldofsky, supra note 18, at 81 ,  or be stepped up at stated intervals. 
The "conversion ratio" expresses the number of shares of common stock the bondholder 
receives upon conversion: 
Conversion Ratio = Face Value 
Conversion Price 
For example, a bond with a face value of $1000 and a conversion price of $50 has a conver­
sion ratio of 20. See generaliy J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 594 (4th 
ed. l977); J .  WESTON & E .  BRIGHA .. \1, supra note 20, at 591; Ingersoll, Contingent Claims, supra 
note 23, at 290-91.  
26.  SeeR. BREALEY, SECURITY PRICES IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET 191 ( 1971 ) ;  J. 
WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 20, at 596. 
27 . See Jennings, supra note 23. 
28. Otherwise known as a "warrant." See, e .g., R. BREALEY, supra note 26, at 191 .  
Berle defines a warrant as a corporate issuer's obligation to deliver its common stock to the 
holder upon payment of a specified sum of money per share upon demand, or within a time and 
on conditions set forth in a governing instrument. See Berle, supra note 7, at 649. Less for­
mally, a warrant can be conceived of as a long term option on the common stock of a corpora­
tion granted for consideration by the corporation itself. 
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sume further that at the time of the bond's issue the issuer's stock is 
trading at $40 and the issuer's value is at D. Debt value at issue is 
$900, reflecting the convertible's lower coupon rate. Conversion 
value is $800, reflecting that the $50 conversion price exceeds the $40 
market price of the underlying common. The premium at issue is 
$100, the difference between the higher of debt or conversion value 
and the initial $1000 market price. 29 Valuation at issue reflects the 
expectation that the issuer's value will increase substantially during 
the early years of the bond's term. 30 
Looking to the right of D in the Figure, we see the bond's con­
version value and market value rising in tandem with higher issuer 
values, illustrating the convertible bond's upside potential. Debt 
value, in contrast, is limited by a fixed coupon rate and does not rise 
significantly. 31 As issuer values increase, the market behavior of the 
convertible increasingly mirrors the market behavior of the underly­
ing common stock and the premium accordingly becomes progres­
sively smaller. Eventually, at G, the issuer's value and the dividend 
payout on the underlying common have increased so much that the 
expected return on the underlying common exceeds the expected re­
turn on the bonds. As a result, the premium disappears and the hold­
ers convert. 
We see the bond's downside market behavior by looking to the 
left of D. Conversion value declines in tandem with the issuer's 
value and the premium disappears as the decline in value becomes 
extreme. Debt value, protected by the bond contract, shows more 
stability and resilience. At B ,  the bond's market value has fallen so 
far as to have become nearly contiguous with debt value; this is the 
"bond floor." As the issuer's value goes into extreme decline to the 
left of B ,  even the bond floor begins seriously to give way. With the 
issuer's value at A, we reach the end of the line-a hypothetical 
bankruptcy liquidation pursuant to which the holders of the con­
vertible issue receive $500 per bond and the stockholders receive 
nothing.3 2 
29. For a description of the pricing process for new issues of convertible bonds, see 
Alexander & Stover, Pricing in the New Issue Convertible Debt Market, FIN. MGMT., Fall 1977, 
at 35-36. 
30. See generally J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 20, at 600-01. 
31. If the Figure were to show the convertible's value as a function of different levels 
of prevailing interest rates, rather than of different firm values, then movement to the right on 
the horizontal axis would cause the debt value line to drop. 
32. The bankruptcy risks facing convertible bondholders are discussed in Ingersoll, 
Contingent Claims, supra note 23, at 309; Brennan & Schwartz, Convertible Valuation, supra 
note 21, at 1710. 
1984:667 Convertible Bonds 677 
2. ELEMENTS OF THE CONVERSION PREMIUM 
We have seen that calculating the conversion value, given a 
constant conversion price, is a matter of valuing the underlying 
common, and that calculating the debt value is a matter of straight 
bond valuation. Valuing the conversion premium, in contrast, is a 
matter of valuing the conversion privilege. Sorting out the interre­
lated variables which constitute and affect the premium is the cen­
tral problem of convertible bond valuation. 
The premium arises, first and foremost, from investors' percep­
tion that advantages lie in having two imperfectly correlated ele­
ments of value-debt value and conversion value----eombined in the 
same security. One advantage of the combination comes from the 
bond's limited downside risk. The downside risk of holding the bond 
is less than that of holding the amount of common into which it is 
convertible because debt value provides a floor should issuer values 
decline. 33 The limited downside risk causes the bond to sell for more 
than its conversion value even when we are to the right of D' in the 
Figure, where higher issuer values cause conversion value to surpass 
debt value. But since the relative importance of bond floor protec­
tion decreases as issuer values increase, the premium also decreases 
as issuer values increase. 
Another advantage comes from the bondholder's  potential up­
side participation. The bond in the Figure still sells at a premium to 
the left of D, even though debt value exceeds conversion value at 
these lower issuer values. This premium results not from bond floor 
downside protection but from the market's hopes that conversion 
value has upside potential. Since this upside potential's relative im­
portance decreases as issuer values decrease, the premium dimin­
ishes so as to disappear entirely when bankruptcy liquidation is 
reached at A. 34 
The premium also results from the convertible's income stream. 
So long as the convertible's coupon rate exceeds the underlying com­
mon's dividend payout rate, it is a more advantageous holding than 
the common. Indeed, so long as the coupon rate exceeds the dividend 
rate, arbitrage possibilities will prevent the bond from selling as low 
33. This floor also gives the convertible greater price stability than the underlying 
common possesses. One therefore can expect a positive correlation between the size of the 
premium and the size of the variance in the price movements of the underlying stock. 
34. See J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 20, at 597; Jennings, supra note 23, at 
33; Walter & Que, supra note 23, at 718; Wei!, Segall & Green, supra note 23, at 446-47. 
Cost advantages of bond over stock investment, arising from lower brokerage fees and 
less restrictive margin rules on bonds, also increase the conversion premium. See Fleischer & 
Cary, supra note 7, at 475; Wei!, Segall & Green, supra note 23, at 446. 
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as conversion value, except immediately prior to declaration of a 
dividend or an adverse change in conversion terms. 3 5 Conversely, as 
is the case in the Figure, if the dividend payout rate eventually ex­
ceeds the coupon rate at higher issuer values, the premium will be 
entirely eliminated. 36 
The premium is also sensitive to the conversion privilege's du­
rability-the longer its life, the greater its value. Conversely, the 
premium is reduced if the issuer retains the power to shorten the 
duration of the conversion privilege. 3 7  Issuers customarily retain 
this power in the form of a redemption or "call" right-the right to 
pay off the bond prior to maturity at the "call price," usually fixed 
at par plus a small premium. 
3. CALL RIGHTS AND CONVERTIBLE BOND VALUATION 
Call rights will reduce the size of the conversion premium in 
varying degrees depending upon the likelihood that the issuer actu­
ally will exercise them. Issuer call policies in turn depend on a 
number of factors, including bond contract provisions, market re­
straints on management actions, and,  at bottom, management 
awareness. 
Most issuers reserve the right to call issues of convertible bonds 
at any time. 3 8 The idea is to force conversion at such time as issuer 
growth causes conversion value to exceed the call price. Since con­
version value is the higher figure, the bondholder converts. 3 9 Forced 
conversion through call advances stockholder interests: if the total 
'35. See Brennan & Schwartz, Convertible Valuation, supra note 21, at 1702. Given 
the stated condition, the bond always sells above its conversion value and the investor will not 
find it optimal to convert at any time prior to maturity, since conversion would result in the 
premium's destruction. I d.; see also B. GRAHAM:, D. DODD & S. CoTTLE, supra note 7, at 607; 
Ingersoll, An Examination of Corporate Call Policies on Convertible Securities, 32 J. FIN. 463, 
464 11977) [hereinafter cited as Ingersoll, Corporate Call Policies]. 
36. At that point, voluntary conversion should occur, preventing the occurrence of 
a negative premium. See J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 20, at 598. 
37. Thus convertible bond contract provisions affect the valuation calculus by their 
effect on the duration of the conversion privilege . 
. 88. Until recently only a minority of currently publicly traded convertible bond 
issues contained contract provisions prohibiting call, and even within this minority the pro­
tection tended to apply only during the first five years of the issue's life. See 13 VALUE LINE 
CONVERTIBLE SURV. 262 (May 3, 1982). 
Due to investor pressure, in 1982 new convertible bond issues began to contain call 
prohibitions applicable for the first two years oi the is.sue's life. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1983, 
§ F, at 10, col. 1. 
39. On the redemption date both bond and conversion privileges disappear and are 
replaced with the right to claim the call price. N�diess to say, the conversion premium disap­
pears also. 
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value of the issuer is the sum of the value of the debt and equity 
claims upon it, then permitting convertibles further to appreciate in 
value as the issuer grows permits the bondholders' claim on the is­
suer's equity to increase at the stockholders' expense. 
In theory, then, a stockholder optimal call policy dictates call 
as soon as the bond 's conversion value exceeds its call price.40 In the 
real world, however, such a call policy would have to permit conver­
sion value to rise somewhat higher than that-probably about 20% 
higher4 1 -in order to assure that a drop in the market price of the 
stock during the period between the call and the redemption date42 
does not discourage voluntary conversion and force the issuer to 
cash out bondholders on the redemption date. 
Actual issuer call practices fall short of this stockholder optimal 
point by a wide margin. The median issuer delays call until conver­
sion value exceeds call price by 43. 9 % ,43 a surprising result in view 
of issuers' assiduous reservation of the contractual right to pursue a 
stockholder optimal policy. One financial economist, not finding a 
rational explanation for this phenomenon, concluded that the com­
prehensive and symmetric market rationality routinely assumed by 
economists44 cannot realistically be applied to convertible bond 
pricing. 45 
A lawyer might take this irrationality to infer managerial negli­
gence, 46 and such an inference has some empirical support. 4 7 This 
bondholder beneficial conduct may, however, have a calculated and 
rational aspect in cases where the issuer expects to return to the long 
40. See Brennan & Schwartz, Analyzing Convertibles, supra note 21, at 910; Inger­
soll, Corporate Call Policies, supra note 35, at 464-65; Ingersoll, Contingent Claims, supra note 
23, at 298-99. To the contrary, it is not optimal for the issuing corporation to call the converti­
ble when its call price exceeds its market value. The amount paid in excess of market value 
would amount to a wealth transfer from the stockholders to the convertible bondholders. 
41. See J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 20, at 599; Ingersoll, Corporate Call 
Policies, supra note 35, at 466-67. 
42. Trust indentures specify a notice period of 30 to 60 days between the call notice 
and the redemption date. 
43. See Ingersoll, Corporate Call Policies, supra note 35, at 466. Ingersoll based his 
study on all convertible bond issues called between 1968 and 1975. 
44. Market rationality theory assumes that each party, firm, and investor pursues 
an optimal strategy and expects all others to do the same. See Brennan & Schwartz, Converti­
ble Valuation, supra note 21, at 1701. 
45. See Ingersoll, Corporate Call Policies, supra note 35, at 472. 
46. See Klein, supra note 11, at 568-69. 
47. Brigham, supra note 20, at 52. Brigham's study, conducted between 1961 and 
1963, found that 23% of the issuers surveyed had an internal policy to force conversion with a 
call as soon as conversion value exceeded call price by 20%. Another 23% of the issuers sur­
veyed reported an internal policy to encourage voluntary conversion by raising common stock 
dividends. The remaining 54% did not bother to formulate any defined call policy. Id. 
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term debt market for future financing. By letting the convertibles 
ride with the common as conversion value surpasses the stockholder 
optimal call point, the issuer signals the financial community that it 
is less than punctilious in its insistence on its contractual rights. In­
vestor confidence that management will take bondholder interests 
into account in resolving stockholder-bondholder conflicts of inter­
est might well redound to the issuer's benefit in the form of lower 
agency costs48 for its next issue of debt securities. 
The call problem illustrates the riskiness of investment in the 
conversion premium. According to one analyst, it is an average of six 
times more risky than investment in the underlying common.49 The 
same analyst tells us that the investors exact a high rate of return-
49% annually-for bearing this risk. 50 These market statistics indi­
cate that the bargain embodied in convertible securities, although 
peculiar in some particulars, at bottom is sound because an efficient 
market correctly perceives the risk and requires a commensurately 
big return. This conclusion would not meet with approval in all 
quarters, however. Legal and financial commentators have been 
complaining for decades that the conversion privilege is an inher­
ently bad deal for both investors and issuers-so bad that even mar­
ket pricing mechanisms cannot mitigate the ensuing damage. 5 1  
B .  Vulnerabilit1r-The Legal Background 
In general, the rational convertible bondholder d oes not exer­
cise the conversion privilege until immediately prior to maturity. 
Earlier conversion is suboptimal because it fixes conversion value as 
an upper limit on the investment's value and thereby sacrifices the 
48. "Agency costs" are costs incurred by the principal in the agency relationship. 
They fall into three categories: ( a )  monitoring costs incurred to limit actions by the agent not 
in the principal's interests; (b) bonding costs, or the costs of payments by the principal to the 
agent to induce the agent not to take actions harming the principal; and (c)  residual loss, or 
the costs of any other decisions of the agent not maximizing the principal's welfare. Jensen & 
Meckling, supra note 3, at 308. 
49. See R. BREALEY, supra note 26, at 201.  
50. See id. at 199, 201. The study covered 164 convertible bond issues floated be­
tween 1948 and 1963. I d. at 195. 
51. On the legal side, one finds Berle and Means attacking warrants, see A. BERLE & 
G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 200-02 ( 1933), and the early 
Securities Exchange Commission weighing in against warrants and convertibles. See, e.g., In 
re Childs Co., 24 S.E.C.  85, 120-22 ( 1946 ) .  Professor Klein's recent work redirects these argu­
ments against convertibles. See Klein, supra note 11. On the financial side, numerous com­
mentators have questioned the value of investing in convertibles. See 1 A. DEWING, supra 
note 2, at 268-69; B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, supra note 7, at 601-02; Lewellen & 
Racette, Convert·ible Debt Financing, 8 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 777, 784-86, 791 
(1973). 
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conversion premium. Selling the unconverted bond, in contrast, per­
mits the rational investor to realize on both conversion value and 
conversion premium prior to maturity. 
There are exceptions to the rule, however. If pending actions by 
issuers will eliminate the bond's conversion premium or eliminate all 
or part of its conversion value, then immediate conversion will be 
more advantageous than continued holding of the bonds. Call is one 
such action, and issuers usually reserve the right to take it at any 
time. Another issuer action-increasing the expected return on the 
underlying common so as to be greater than the expected return on 
the bonds-benefits the bondholder even while causing the premium 
to disappear. Still other issuer actions have the effect of diluting or 
destroying conversion value and thus might precipitate preemptive 
conversion. These diluent and destructive actions are the source of 
the sharpest conflicts between convertible bondholder and stock­
holder interests. To the extent the issuer is free to take them, the 
bondholders' investment in the conversion privilege is vulnerable to 
recapture for the stockholders' benefit. 
The following subparts describe and critique the prevailing le­
gal model for resolving these conflicts and allocating the risks of di­
lution and destruction. The discussion focuses on the analysis em­
ployed in this model, its apparent efficiency advantages, and its 
persistent shortcomings. 
1 .  DILUTION, DESTRUCTION AND CLASSICAL CONTRACT LAW 
A number of issuer actions can dilute or destroy conversion 
value and give rise to the conflicts that the legal model must resolve. 
Conversion value is diluted when the issuer increases the number of 
outstanding common shares without proportionately increasing its 
vaiue. The result is a decline in the price per share of the common 
and ,  unless an adjustment is made, in conversion value. Stock splits, 
stock dividends, and issuer sales of additional common below mar­
ket value are the best examples. 5 2  Conversion value is destroyed 
whenever, as with a dividend, the issuer disgorges assets for less than 
equivalent consideration. The extent of the destruction depends on 
52. Consider a bond with a conversion price of $20. The stock price has risen to $20 
from $15 at the time of the bond's original issue. If the issuer splits the common stock two-for­
one, the price per share of the stock drops to $10,  destroying much of the value of the conver­
sion privilege. The issuer achieves the same result through four consecutive quarterly 25% 
stock dividends, assuming its value stays constant during the period. If the issuer were to 
mount a successful rights offering to its existing common stockholders, it also could cause the 
common stock price to fall to $10 ,  provided that it priced the shares offered below $10  and sold 
a sufficient number. 
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the amount of  assets disgorged .  For example, a spin-off of  a subsidi­
ary containing half of an issuer's business, halves the value of both 
the issuer's equity and the convertible bondholders' claims, yet 
leaves the stockholders with a substantially equivalent economic 
participation in two entities. 5 3 Total destruction of conversion 
value occurs when the issuer, the underlying common, or both cease 
to exist altogether. This can result from a recapitalization, a merger 
or consolidation with another corporation, or liquidation and 
dissolution. 
Early convertible bond contracts did not include provisions re­
specting such diluent and destructive actions. This omission fos­
tered a series of cases at the turn of the century dealing with such 
issuer actions. 54 The cases, still often followed today, 5 5  always re­
jected bondholder claims to the sort of fiduciary protections granted 
stockholders. 56 
In the leading case of Parkinson v. West End Street Railway, 5 7  
Judge, later Justice, Holmes characterized the conversion privilege 
as "an option to take the stock as it may turn out to be when the 
time for choice arrives. " 5 8 Thus pictured, 5 9 the conversion privilege 
53. A fundamental corporate change, such as the sale of all or substantially all of the 
issuer's assets to another entity, similarly might partially destroy the value of the conversion 
privilege if carried out for less than fair consideration. 
54. See Lisman v. Milwaukee, L.S. & W. Ry., 161 F. 472 (E .  D. Wis. 1908) , aff'd per 
curiam, 170 F. 1020 ( 7th Cir. ) ,  cert. denied, 214 U.S. 520 ( 1909) ( stock for stock exchange 
followed by sale of all assets for nominal consideration) ;  Parkinson v. West End St. Ry., 173 
Mass. 446, 53 N.E. 891 ( 1899) ( Holmes, J . )  ( consolidation) ;  John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Worcester N.  & R.R.R., 149 Mass. 214, 21  N.E.  364 ( 1899) (same) ;  Day v. Worcester N. & 
R.R.R. , 151  Mass. 302, 23 N.E.  824 ( 1 890) ( same) ;  Pratt v. American Bell Tel. Co. ,  141  Mass. 
225, 5 N.E.  307 ( 1886) ( rights offering) ;  Sutliff v. Cleveland & M. R.R., 24 Ohio St. 1 47 ( 1873) 
( stock dividend) ;  Gay v. Burgess Mills, 30 R.I .  231 ,  74 A. 714 ( 1909) ( stock split; stock divi­
dend) .  See generally Hills, supra note 7, at 2-4, 31-34; Buxbaum, supra note 7 ,  at 287-88. 
55. See, e.g., Broad v. Rockwell lnt'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 944-45 ( 5th Cir . )  ( en 
bane) ,  cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 ( 1981 ) ;  Kessler v. General Cable Corp., 92 Cal. App. 3d 531, 
539, 1 55 Cal. Rptr. 94, 99-100 ( 1 979) .  
56. The turn-of-the-century corporate law system of protection against self inter­
ested actions might have supported implied in law anti-dilution protections had the courts 
seen fit to grant corporate status. See, e.g., Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest 
and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 36-43 ( 1 966). 
57. 173 Mass. 446, 53 N.E. 891 ( 1899 ) .  Parkinson and two earlier Massachusetts 
cases dealing with consolidations, Day v. Worcester N. & R. R.R.,  151  Mass. 302, 23 N.E.  824 
( 1890) and John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Worcester N. & R. R.R., 149 Mass. 214, 21 
N.E.  364 ( 1889) ,  recognize a limited class of situations where the conversion privilege will be 
enforced against the successor corporation because the consolidation is a merely formal 
change leaving the issuer's capital structure largely intact. According to Buxbaum, supra note 
7, at 288, this exception no longer is accepted. 
58. 173 Mass. at 448, 53 N .E.  at 892. 
59. See also Lisman v. Milwaukee, L.S. & W. Ry., 161 F. 472, 475 ( E. D .  Wis. 1 908),  
aif'd per curiam, 170 F.1020 ( 7th Cir. ) ,  cert. denied, 214 U.S. 520 ( 1909) .  
1984:667 Convertible Bonds 683 
more closely resembled the fragile unaccepted offer of contract law 
than the bundle of rights bound up in a share of common stock. 60 
Corporate law categorization thereby was precluded and with it the 
possibility of fairness scrutiny of issuer actions. 
Once characterization was completed and convertibles catego­
rized on the contract side of the line, the turn-of-the-century issuer 
had all but won the war. Classical contract law tended to allocate 
the burden of drafting an explicit provision to the party seeking to 
enforce the right. 6 1  The courts stated that they had no business 
making contracts for the parties and that this approach effectuated 
the parties' expectations. 62 The reasoning in the convertible bond 
cases fell into this mold.  Since the conversion privilege imported no 
inherent protection against dilution, parties expecting protection 
explicitly would provide for it. 6 3 !vforeover, because the conversion 
privilege was a speculation, the courts in ferred that the parties in­
tended the bondholder to bear the risk of dilution and destruction. 64 
Judicial intervention to protect the conversion privilege would de­
prive the issuer of the necessary flexibility to initiate fundamental 
corporate changes. 6 5 
None of this analysis stands up today.66  The characterization 
of the naked conversion privilege as a fragile option, while perfectly 
felicitous, is by no means inevitable. One can with equal felicity 
characterize the premium paid for the conversion privilege at origi­
nal issue as an "equity" investment in the issuer and go on from 
60. Stockholder rights accrued only upon the holder's acceptance of the "offer" in 
the time, place and manner specified therein. Pratt v. American Bell Tel. Co.,  141 Mass. 225, 
230, 5 N . E .  307, 3 1 1  ( 1886) .  Far from conferring stockhoider rights, the conversion privilege 
was separate and independent from the bond, albeit physically attached to it. Hotchkiss v. 
National Banks, 88 U .S.  ( 2 1  Wall . )  354, 357 ( 1874 ) ;  H ills, supra note 7,  at 2. 
The courts did impose on the issuer an implied duty to use reasonable diligence to keep 
the underlying stock available for lawful issuance upon conversion pursuant to the bond con­
tract. See Marony v. Wheeling & L.E.  Ry.,  33 F.Zd 916, 917 ( S.D.N.Y. 1 929) ;  Bratten v. 
Catawissa R.R.,  21 1 Pa. 21 ,  25, 60 A. 319,  320 ( 1905) .  
6 1 .  Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty t o  Perform in Good Faith, 
94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 391-93 ( 1980 ) .  
62. See Farnsworth, Disputes over Omissions in  Contracts, 6 8  Cou;M:. L. REV. 860, 
862-63, 870 ( 1 968) [hereinafter cited as Farnsworth, Omissions]. 
63. See Parkinson v. West End St. Ry., 173 Mass. 446, 448-49, 53 N . E .  891 ,  892 
( 1899 ) ;  Pratt v. American Bell Tel. Co., 141 Mass. 225, 229, 5 N . E. 307, 3 1 1  ( 1886 ) .  Cf. Lis­
man v. Milwaukee L.S. & VI. Ry. ,  161 F. 472, 478 ( E .D.  Wis. 1908 ) ,  a.ff'd per curiam, 170 F. 
1020 ( 7th Cir . ) ,  cert. denied, 214 U.S.  520 ( 1909) .  
64. See Lisman v. Milwaukee, L.S. & W .  Ry., 1 6 1  F.  472, 4?6 ( E .  D .  Wi.s. l908) ,  aff'd 
per curiam, 170 F. 1 020 ( 7th Cir . ) ,  cert. denied, 214 U.S. 520 ( 1909 ) .  
65. See Parkinson v.  West End St. Ry., 173 Mass. 446, 448, 53 N . E .  891, 892 ( 1899) .  
66. Berie found the old cases uncompelling 50 years ago, proposing that the issuer 
be required to "maintain the integrity" of the underl_ying shares. Berle, supra note 7, at 654-
56. See also Keith, supra note 18, at 32-33. 
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there to require corporate law treatment of diluent and destructive 
issuer actions. 
Nor would the issuer win today on the contract side of the line. 
Courts no longer confine themselves to classical assumptions about 
contract relations. Under today's neoclassical approach, the old ru­
bric that the "court will not make a contract for the parties" gives 
way to the directive that the parties act in "good faith" so as not to 
destroy or injure the right of the other party to receive the fruits of 
the contract. The neoclassically inclined court seeks to effectuate the 
parties' expectations without a preconceived placement of the draft­
ing burden. It assumes that both parties are equally situated so far 
as self -protection through drafting is concerned-the promisor can 
insist on an express condition just as easily as the promisee can insist 
on an additional express promise. 6 7 
Finally, subsequent events show that the classical courts proba­
bly incorrectly divined the parties' intentions concerning risk alloca­
tion. Investors and lawyers quickly responded to the courts' rulings 
by developing sophisticated bondholder protective provisions and 
making them the norm in convertible bond contracts. By the 1 920's 
these anti-dilution measures contained the principal constituent ele­
ments of today's standard form provisions. 6 8  They protect against 
diluent and partially destructive actions by triggering proportion­
ate reductions in the conversion price. 69 Conversion value remains 
unaffected by the action in question as a result. They protect against 
destructive events such as mergers, recapitalizations, and liquida­
tions by creating a right to convert into the same securities or other 
consideration being distributed to the common stockholders in con-
67. Burton, supra note 6 1 ,  at 392. See also Summers, The General Duty of Good 
Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORN. L. REV. 810 ( 1 982). 
68. Hills' thorough description of the provisions of the conversion instrument of the 
late 1920's usefully can be compared point for point with the anti-dilution provisions of the 
ABF's model indenture. Compare ABF CoMMENTARIES, supra note 2 ,  at 543-50 ( Sample Pro­
vision § 13-6, Alternate 1 ) ,  with Hills, supra note 7 ,  at 22-38. Hills' standard provisions re­
specting stock splits, id. at 22, stock dividends, id. at 23-24, news issues of common stock, id. 
at 25-26 (conversion price formula) ,  recapitalizations, id. at 22-23, and mergers, consolida­
tions, asset sales and liquidations, id. at 31-35, do not differ in substance from the provisions in 
the model indenture. See also the forms for warrants appearing in Garner & Forsythe, supra 
note 18, at 286-88, app. ;  Keith, supra note 18, at 20-24. 
69. ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 543-57 ( Sample Provision § 1 3-6 ) .  
A second generation standardized form o f  trust indenture recently appeared under the 
auspices of the Committee on Developments in Business Financing of the Section of Corpora­
tion, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association. This " Model Simplified 
Indenture" is billed as a "plain language" form. See Section of Corporation, Banking and 
Business Law, American Bar Ass'n, Model Simplified Indenture, 38 Bus. LAW. 741 , 742 ( 1983) 
[hereinafter cited as Model Simplified Indenture]. The Model Simplified Indenture contains 
conversion provisions. Id. at 764-69 ( Sample Provisions, article 10 ) .  
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nection with the particular transaction. 7 0 They remain the norm 
today. 
This emphatic response implies that parties to the early bond 
contracts never contemplated that the conversion privilege has no 
protection against dilution and destruction, and that the contracts' 
lack of explicit protections did not compel the conclusion that the 
parties intended that the bondholders bear the risk. The problem 
may not have even occurred to the drafters, the issuers, or the hold­
ers. Even if it did occur to some or all of them, the only "intent" 
involved may have been a conscious decision to leave the risk 
unallocated. 
This response also shows that the courts need not have worried 
about tying management's hands. The devices just described left 
management's hands free while simultaneously preventing transfers 
of value from bondholders to stockholders. 
The old cases never have been judicially overruled, however. 
They survive not because they allocate risks in such a way as to 
provide the marketplace with a sound basis for issuing billions of 
dollars worth of bonds, but rather because the standard bond con­
tract so effectively overrides their allocation of the risks of dilution 
and destruction. Consequently, decades passed before b ondholders 
had cause to return to the courts to request that the cases and their 
restrictive approach be overruled. 
2.  EFFICIENCY ADVANTAGES OF THE CLASSICAL CONTRACT LAW 
APPROACH 
The old cases extended an implied invitation to the market­
place to come up with its own express alternative allocation of risks. 
And just as the marketplace response explains the survival of the old 
cases, so might it also justify future adherence to them. I f  the stan­
dard form bond contract both efficiently allocates the risks of dilu­
tion and destruction and adequately protects the bondholders' ex­
pectations, no further supplemental or regulatory judicial action 
may be necessary, even under a neoclassical approach. 
70. See ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 528-30, 547, 549-50 (Sample Provi-
sions §§ 13-6 ( C ) ,  Alternate 1 and 1 3-6(G),  Alternate 1 ) .  See also Model Simplified Indenture, 
supra note 69, at 755 ( Sample Provision 5.01 ) .  
Advance notice requirements provide a lesser order o f  protection. Like call notice provi­
sions, these permit the holder to realize the bond's conversion value prior to consummation of 
the diluent or destructive action. They afford cold comfort if the conversion price exceeds the 
conversion value. 
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The turn-of-the-century cases in effect .chose standard form 
contract terms over judge-made rules as the mode for allocating the 
risks of convertibility. Standard form contracts serve the same risk­
allocating functions with respect to some publicly-traded securities 
that contract law gap-filling rules and judge-made and statutory 
provisions of corporate law do with respect to others. Standard 
forms save costs by filling in terms of the relationship when sui 
generis negotiation is too expensive, and by facilitating efficient mar­
ket pricing. On the latter point, consider the case of bonds. If traders 
safely can assume that known standard provisions govern each 
bond, they can value the bond based on a smaller and more manage­
able set of variables without inspecting the contract governing the 
particular issue. 7 1 
Standard form anti-dilution provisions doubtless have per­
formed these risk-allocating functions as efficiently as judge-made 
rules would have done. Indeed, there are many reasons to conclude 
that the contractual mode is the more efficient choice. Development 
of a precise system of corporate law anti-dilution rules might very 
well have been difficult and costly as courts took the time to choose 
between competing anti-dilution theories. In con trast, contractual 
anti-dilution provisions have proved comparatively inexpensive. 
Most of the costs of their development were incurred prior to 1 929, 
and the marketplace has been reaping positive returns on the invest­
ment ever since, as the corporate bar has merely used the same form 
over and over again. A few material changes in the form have been 
introduced gradually, 7 2 and only a minimal amount of litigation re­
specting the form has been reported.  7 3  
Today's standard form bond contract apparently continues to 
save costs. It  achieves a degree of clarity and certainty which ap­
proaches that of a statutory scheme and which a corporate law anti­
dilution system, whether based on arbitrary line-drawing or on judi­
cial intuitions of fairness, could not equal. The American Bar Foun-
71. See RESTATE.\!:ENT ( SECOND ) OF CONTRACTS § 211 comment a ( 1981 ) ;  Llewellyn, 
What Price Contract?-A.n Essay in Perspectit,e, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 721 .  731 ( 1931 ). See also 
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUM. L .  REV. 
629, 631 ( 1943) .  The process works differentiy for privately placed long-term debt !"e{!urities. 
These are sold in large denominations to smali numbers of institutional investors and most of 
their governing provisions are heavily negotiated. 
72. The principal changes are discussed infra notes 76, 1 1 1 ,  1 70, and text accompa­
nying note 86. 
73. See Hills, supra note 7, at 1. According to Hills, .30 cases concerning the conver­
sion privilege were reported during the period 1860-1880, and another 30 cases during the 
period 1880-1930. Research done in connection with the preparation of this Article suggests 
that less than 30 such cases have reached appellate courts since 1930 (excluding tax cases and 
cases raising issues only under the federal securities laws) .  
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dation's readily available Model Indenture precisely "restates" the 
standard form. 74 A high degree of uniformity exists among the pro­
visions governing different issues of bonds, as was shown by a survey 
of trust indentures covering convertible bonds first issued and sold 
between October 1 ,  1981 and September 30,  1982, made in connec­
tion with the preparation of this Article. 7 5 
The history of standard anti-dilution provisions shows that the 
form also has been responsive to shifting market conditions. The 
standard provisions draw fine lines between stockholder and bond­
holder interests, some of which have been redrawn as views on the 
overall function of anti-dilution provisions have changed. 7 6 Such 
developments show that the marketplace actors who generate these 
standard risk allocations, whether they be issuers, market traders, 
or market intermediaries such as underwriters and corporate law­
yers, 7 7  can arrive at precise and well-considered answers to anti-di­
lution questions, despite standardization. 
74. See supra note 69. 
75. Forty-six trust indentures were surveyed, covering convertible bonds publicly 
issued between October 1, 1981 and September 30, 1982. To cite one example of their uniform­
ity, 43 of the 46 contained "market price" clauses covering subsequent issues of common 
stock. 
76. For example, during the last 25 years the once universal "conversion price" 
clause covering new issues of common stock and rights to acquire common stock has almost 
entirely disappeared from public issue bond contracts to be replaced by a "market price" 
clause covering a smaller class of transactions. 
The discarded "conversion price" formula provided for downward adjustment of the 
conversion price whenever stock was sold below the conversion price. For further explanation, 
see ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 530-31 .  This approach reflected the financial com­
munity's original conception of the conversion privilege as an option on a specified proportion 
of the issuer's earnings. See Kaplan, supra note 7, at 18 n.27. This percentage ownership con­
cept went into eclipse in the 1950's and 1960's and was replaced by two distinct notions. The 
first was that what needed protection in convertible bond contracts was not a percentage 
ownership claim but the current market level of conversion value and conversion premium. 
The second notion was that anti-dilution provisions should operate only when stockholders 
receive a benefit at the bondholders' expense, and that otherwise there should be parity of 
treatment. Id. at 20, 21 n.3 1 .  "Market price" anti-dilution clauses followed from these no­
tions. At their narrowest, market price clauses provide for downward adjustment of the con­
version price only in response to below market offerings of new stock and rights to existing 
common stockholders. For further explanation, see ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 532-
33. See also Model Simplified Indenture, supra note 69, at 766 ( Sample Provision 10.07 ) ;  
Kaplan, Some Purther Comments o n  Anti-Dilution Clauses, 2 3  Bus. LAW. 893 ( 1968). 
In  the survey undertaken in connection with the preparation of this Article, all but five 
of the trust indentures contained the market price formula in the narrow version. See supra 
note 75. 
The rise of the market price formula prompted a spirited debate over its merits. Com­
pare Kaplan, supra note 7, with Ratner, Dilution and Anti-Dilution: A Reply to Professor 
Kaplan, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 496-97 ( 1966) .  
77 .  Some changes in  the drafting of  convertible bond contracts clearly have 
stemmed from investor demands on underwriters for additional protection. See N.Y. Times, 
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Finally, being contract terms, standard form provisions can re­
spond to the aberrant case more flexibly than can judge-made and 
statutory provisions. Indeed, antimdilution protection can be quite 
sensitive to exercises of bargaining power. In a heavily negotiated 
private placement of convertible bonds, the holder's bargaining 
strength 7 8 might be manifested by anti-dilution provisions offering 
less flexibility to the issuer than the "standard" scheme. 79 
If, indeed ,  standard form contracting protects convertible 
bondholder interests and allocates risks of dilution and destruction 
more efficiently than common law processes would have done, then 
standard anti-dilution provisions probably would have come into 
existence even if the early courts had been more interventionist. 
Judge-made bondholder protective rules need not, and probably 
would not, have been formulated as unwaivable rules entirely 
grounded in fiduciary concepts of fairness. They more likely would 
have functioned as equitable gap-fillers, subject to variation by 
agreement. 80 Given the usual uncertainties which attend the devel­
opment of judicial rules, the marketplace would have found it cost 
effective to force the judge-made rules to yield to its own more pre­
cise formulations. In sum, classical judicial restraint and the mar­
ketplace contracting process have interacted ·with apparent success 
to alloc.ate the risks of dilution and destruction. The burden to jus­
tify judicial intervention is correspondingly high. 
3. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CLASSICAL CONTRACT LAW APPROACH-­
RESIDUAL RISKS OF DILUTION AND DESTRUCTION 
Under the classicai approach, the drafter who wants to prevent 
a given risk of dilution or destruction from being automatically allo-
supra note 38, § 3, at 10, col. 1, concerning the rapid standardization of two year call prohibi­
tions in response to investor pressure. In the case of the transition from conversion to market 
price formula, discussed supra note 76, the im�tus for change could just as easily have come 
from market intermediaries and changes in their notions of reasonableness and fairness as 
from the exercise of economic power between buyers and sellers. 
78. Private placements of debt securities tend to take place among medium and 
small sized issuers and institutional investors, such as insurance companies and pension funds, 
sufficiently large and sophisticated to appraise the risks entailed. See generally V. BRUDNEY & 
M .  CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 121-22. 
79. For example, destructive actions such as mergers and liquidations could be pro­
hibited entirely. An emint:nt law firm recommends that anti-dilution clauses in private place­
ments forbid triangular mergers where neither the surviving corporation nor its ultimate par­
ent is publicly traded. Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons & Gates, Investments in Warrants and 
Convertibies 17 (June 1 1, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Debevoise, Plimpton, Investments in 
Convertibles]. 
80. See Anderson, supra note 1 ,  at 753-54; Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational 
Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1 089, 1 090 ( 1981 ) .  
1 984:667 Convertible Bonds 689 
cated to the bondholders must foresee, identify, and deal with the 
risk explicitly. This is a considerable task, since any change in the 
issuer's equity structure, asset base, or identity creates a risk of dilu­
tion or destruction. Whatever its efficiency advantages, today's 
standard public-issue form does not attain this ideal of a complete 
contingent contract. It covers the most likely contingencies and 
many unlikely contingencies as well, but it neither covers all foresee­
able types of diluent or destructive action, nor provides explicit in­
structions for treatment of all of the variant situations which can 
arise respecting issuer actions that are covered. 8 1  Any one of these 
untreated residual contingencies can seriously erode the value of the 
conversion privilege. Not surprisingly, much of the last decade's 
convertible bond litigation has concerned these residual risks. A few 
examples of these risks follow. 
Included among the residual risks is the creation of a new class 
of preferred stock, and its offer on a rights basis to existing common 
stockholders on attractive terms. The higher the dividend rate on 
the new preferred, the greater the diminution in value of the com­
mon stock and,  hence, of the conversion privilege. 82 The standard 
form's failure to include a clause dealing with this device is surpris­
ing and commentators have flagged the dangers of the omission. 8 3 
Another diluent device, not anticipated until recently by the 
standard form, is the spin-off of the stock of subsidiaries, which be­
came popular after World War I I .  84 Spin-offs hold out the possibil� 
ity of substantial or total destruction of conversion value, depending 
on the size of the subsidiary spun off. Yet even in the early 1970's 
81 .  See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. 
Certain minor diluent actions, such as the issue of stock pursuant to an employee stock 
option plan, are treated in the standard provisions, but are excepted from their anti-dilution 
protections. See Kaplan, supra note 7, at 7 n.15.  
82. See Kaplan, supra note 7 ,  at 17-18.  While the anti-dilution provisions in the 
ABF's model indenture fail to pick up burdensome preferred, they easily could be adjusted to 
do so through extension of the definitions of "Common Stock" and "Additional Stock" to 
cover designated new issues of preferred. See ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 541, 544-
45, 550-51 ( Sample Provisions §§ 13-1 and 13-6, Alternates 1 and 2) .  
83 .  A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 5 1 ,  at  202; Kaplan, supra note 7 ,  at 17-18. 
The device has been used with devastating effectiveness to impair the value oi issues of 
preferred stock. See Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp. ,  53 F. Supp. 198 ( D .  Del. 1943) ,  aff'd, 
146 F. 2d 701 ( 3d Cir. 1944) (creation of senior issue of preferred stock exchangeable for ex­
isting preferred as device to eliminate existing preferred's dividend arrearages) .  
84. The device was not new, however. See Jacobs, The Anatomy of a Spin-Of , 1 967 
DuKE L.J. 1 ,  3-6. The Securities Exchange Commission became concerned about the device's 
increased use in the late 1960's. See Securities Act Rei. No. 4982 (July 2, 1969) ,  reprinted in 
FED. SEC. L. REP. ( CCH)  � 77,725 ( 1 969-70) .  
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many anti-dilution provisions made no mention of spin-offs. 8 5 The 
financial community and corporate bar have since apparently be­
come fully aware of this risk and have determined that the bond­
holders should not bear it. All of the recent anti-dilution provisions 
surveyed in connection with the preparation of this Article provided 
for conversion price adjustments in respect to spin-offs. 8 6  
Other residual risks arise when standard contract language is 
applied to cases coming within its literal scope, but not foreseen in 
all particulars by the original drafter. 8 7  The application of standard 
merger language in the context of a cash out merger provides an ex­
ample. The language was first formulated in the 1920's, and contin­
ues to be used today in substantially similar form. 88 It provides a 
right to convert the bond "into the kind and amount of stock, secur­
ities or assets receivable upon such . . . merger . . . by a holder of 
the number of shares of Common Stock into which such [bond] 
might have been converted immediately prior to such . . .  
merger . . . .  " 89 Literal appliction of this language in the case of a 
cash out merger freezes the value of the conversion privilege and 
destroys its upside growth potential. This question of contract inter­
pretation was the subject of the Broad v. Rockwell International 
Corp. 90 litigation and is dealt with in detail below. 91 
The standard form's limitations and the resulting residual risks 
have not escaped the notice of the corporate bar. The bar has de­
vised the so�alled "good faith" anti-dilution provision, designed to 
dispose of the entire problem. This provision catches all actions not 
otherwise covered which "materially and adversely affect the con­
version rights of the . . .  holders, " 92 thereby shifting the residual 
85. See 1 VALUE LINE CONVERTIBLE BoND SERV. 3 (Dec. 9, 1968 ) .  Resulting litiga­
tion is discussed infra notes 101-26. 
86. See supra note 75. Examples of anti-dilution provisions fully covering spin-offs 
can be found in ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 553 ( Sample Provision § 13-6( C ) ,  Alter­
nate 3) and in the Model Simplified Indenture, supra note 69, at 766-67 ( Sample Provision 
Hl.08 ) .  
87. See also infra note 99 and accompanying text. 
88. See Hills, supra note 7,  at 35. 
89. ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 550 ( Sample Provision § 1 3-6 ( G ) ,  Alter­
nate 1 ) .  See also 1viodel Simplified Indenture, supra note 69, at 755 ( Sample Provision 5.0 1 ) .  
90. 614 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1980 ) ,  vacated, 642 F.2d 929 ( 5th Cir. ) (en bane) ,  cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 965 ( 1981 ) .  
9 1 .  See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
92. Kaplan, supra note 7,  at 18 n.27 (quoting provision from trust indenture ) .  One 
law finn comments that "This (type of provision] may seem like lazy lawyering, but in an area 
as complex a.s this we believe such a provision is the better part of discretion. ' '  Debevoise, 
Plimpton, Investments in Convertibles, supra note 79, at 17. 
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risk from the bondholders to the issuer, and overriding the results of 
the turn-of-the-century cases. 
The good faith clause has not found its way into the standard 
form, however. Thus, the door remains open to judicial intervention 
for the protection of bondholders in the convertible bond context. 
IL JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN THE CONVERTIBLE BOND 
RELATIONSHIP-THE VEHICLE OF INTERPRETATION 
This Article now turns to the question of whether some expecta­
tions arising from the convertible bond relationship, although un­
protected in the bond contract, are important enough to justify judi­
cial intervention. The analysis is divided into two parts. The first 
part sets forth the doctrinal framework for intervention-neoclassi­
cally expanded contract interpretation. The following part consid­
ers the appropriate judicial allocation of the risks respecting con­
vertible bonds, centering upon the operation of the bond market, 
and its place in shaping and limiting the expectations of issuers and 
holders. 
A .  Interpretation and Intervention 
Judicial intervention into contractual relationships often oc­
curs within the doctrinal framework of contract interpretation. 9 3 
When a contract is ambiguous, the court called upon to enforce it 
must intervene to clarify the meaning of its terms or to fill in such 
terms as the parties failed to include. The degree of judicial inter­
vention varies with the situation. The more ambiguous the contrac­
tual language, the more the court must serve as the relationship's 
law giver. 
In making protection of the parties' expectations the goal of the 
interpretive process, contract law tries to let the parties define the 
fair result for themselves94 and to limit judicial intervention. But 
such limited intervention is not always possible. In some cases 
neither text nor context provides a reliable indicator of the parties' 
expectations, leaving to the court the entire job of formulating law 
for the relationship . Here a court might impose its own conception 
of fairness by finding the result which best preserves equivalence in 
93. The discussion in the text is distilled from Bratton, The Interpretation of Con­
lmcts Governing Corporate Debt Relationships, 5 CARDOZD L. REV. 371 ( 1984 ) .  
94. For a definition of fairness keyed t o  the parties' expectations, see Anderson, 
supra note 1 ,  at 7 46 n.25.  
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the values exchanged by the parties. 9 5  Or it might subordinate the 
merits as between the particular parties and look for the most effi­
cient result. 96  On this latter level of inquiry, minimal future transac­
tion cost and maximal marketplace certainty are paramount 
considerations. 
The degree of intervention also varies with the court's doctrinal 
approach to interpretation. Classical contract doctrine9 7 tends to 
confine the court to linguistic, structural, and textual analysis 
bounded by the "four corners of the document. "  Neoclassical analy­
sis, based on the insight that texts do not have immutable meanings, 
is more expansive. It bids the court to consider the entire circum­
stances of the relationship to assure selection of the meaning most 
consonant with the parties' expectations. 9 8  Through freely interpo­
lated good faith duties, neoclassical interpretation also brings ethi­
cal restraints to bear on self-interested conduct damaging to the in­
terests of other parties to the contract . 
Courts tend to draw on classical contract law principles when 
interpreting bond contracts. They assume that each clause of an ex­
haustively drafted document, such as a bond contract, embodies an 
exact allocation of risk. As a result they tend to interpret bond con­
tracts in search of a hidden, true meaning to be found by applying 
the correct. classical interpretive calculus. But these judicial percep­
tions are inaccurate. A limited classical approach to bond contract 
interpretation often fails to protect some of the expectations at 
stake. 
Issuer and bondholder expectations do not coalesce around an 
easily ascertainable standard usage in every case. Even all the law­
yerly care lavished on the standard form trust indenture does not 
guarantee the absence of vagueness and ambiguity.99  In addition, 
95. See Farnsworth, Omissions, supra note 62, at 873. 
96. See, e.g., James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros. ,  64 F.2d 344, 346 ( 2d Cir. 1933) (L. 
Hand, J . ) ;  Farnsworth, Omissions, supra note 62, at 878-79; B urton, supra note 6 1 ,  at 392-94. 
97. See Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y . )  (L. Hand, J . )  
a.If'd, 201 F .  664 ( 2d Cir. ) ,  a.ff'd, 2 3 1  U . S .  5 0  ( 1 91 1 ) ;  Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpreta­
tion, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417 ( 1899) .  
98. The usual indicators are brought to bear-the contract language, the parties' 
negotiations, recitals, courses of dealing, usages of trade, and so forth. See Farnsworth,  Omis­
s·ions, s·upra note 62, at 877. 
99. Examples of poor drafting abound in cases that arose before the achievement of 
today's degree of standardization. See Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. New York Trust 
Co.,  184 F.2d 954 ( 2d Cir. 1950) ( poor drafting involving exercise price of warrants in case of 
stock dividend) ;  Mueller v.  Howard Aircraft Corp.,  329 Ill. App. 570, 70 N . E.2d 203 ( 1 946) 
(ambiguity concerning redemption caused bondholder to escape call ) .  
For a more recent example o f  poor drafting see, Sharon Steei Corp. v .  Chase Manhattan 
Bank, N.A.,  691 F.2d 1 039 (2d Cir. 1982 ) ,  cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 103 S . Ct.  1253 ( 1 983 ) .  
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possibilities for error abound whenever the standard form is modi­
fied to suit the requirements of a particular transaction. Such errors 
easily can create situations in which a classical interpretation, based 
on standard English usage or the document's apparent regulatory 
scheme, does not accord with the market's expectations concerning 
the contract's meaning. 1 00 
Similar variances can arise in routine transactions when unfore­
seen events come within the literal scope of long-standing standard 
language. Such a situation arose in Broad v. Rockwell International 
Corp. 1 0 1  and a number of similar convertible bond cases. 1 0 2  In these 
cases involving cash mergers, issuers applied the standard anti-dilu­
tion provision for carry over conversion rights in mergers so as to 
limit the bondholders' future conversion rights to the amount of the 
cash consideration offered in the merger. The issue was whether the 
cash was "other property" within the meaning of a standard clause 
providing for carry over conversion rights into the "stock, securities 
or other property" receivable in the merger by the underlying com­
mon . 1 0 3 Under one standard usage, "property" includes "cash." 
1 00 .  See, e .g. ,  Harris v. Union Elec. C o . ,  622 S.W.2d 239 ( Mo. App. 1 981 ) .  
1 0 1 .  6 1 4  F.2d 4 1 8  ( 5th Cir. 1 980 ) ,  vacated, 642 F.2d 929 ( 5th Cir. )  ( en bane ) ,  cert. 
denied, 454 U.S.  965 ( 1981 ) .  
1 02. See Brucker v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Europe N.V., 424 F .  Supp. 679 (S .D .N.Y.  
1 976 ) ,  a.ff'd, 559 F.2d 1202 ( 2d Cir. 1 977)  (approving settlement agreement in injunctive ac­
tion by convertible bondholder against short form merger) .  Cj. Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 
F.R.D. 361 ( D .  Del. 1 97 5 )  ( warrantholder challenge to short form merger) .  Broenen v. Beau­
nit Corp. ,  440 F.2d 1 244 ( 7th Cir. 1970 ) and Levine v. Chesapeake & O .R.R., 60 App. Div. 2d 
246, 400 N .Y.S. 2d 76 ( 1 977 ) ,  concern the status of convertible bondholders following tender 
offers. 
B .S.F.  Co. v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 42 Del. Ch. 1 06, 204 A.2d 746 (Sup. Ct. 1964 ) ,  
concerned the sale for cash of 7 5 %  o f  the assets o f  a n  issuer o f  convertible bonds. The pur­
chaser of the assets did not grant conversion rights into its stock, even though the trust inden­
ture provided that in case of a sale of assets or merger the bonds would be convertible into 
common shares of the issuer or common shares of the acquiring company. The court heid that 
this language was unambiguous, and would apply only in a case where stock of the purchaser 
was consideration for the assets. The court reasoned that since the issuer added the cash con­
sideration to its asset base, and the bondholder could participate in it by converting into 
common stock, the transaction did not prejudice the holder. I d. at 750-52. 
The court's analysis must be questioned. The language aLso could be read to require a 
choice of conversion into the issuer's or purchaser's stock. Moreover, if all of the assets with 
upside potential were sold for cash and the cash remaining after provision for payment of the 
bonds transferred to the stockholders by means of a dividend, then the bondholders in effect 
would have been deprived of most of their conversion value. On the other hand, if the cash 
were reinvested in equities or some other volatile asset, then the bondholders really would not 
have any cause to complain. Given the lack of clarity and the bondholders' vulnerability, the 
court appropriately could have decided the case in their favor. 
Another issue of interpretation presented in B.S.F. Co. is discussed in Bratton, supra 
note 93, at 386-87. 
103.  614 F.2d 4 1 8  ( 5th Cir. 1980 ) ,  vacated, 642 F.2d 929 ( 5th Cir . )  ( en bane ) ,  cert. 
dem:ed, 454 U.S.  965 ( 1 981 ) .  The tr;Jst indenture in Broad provided for the right to "convert 
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The Broad I 11 04 court so held, taking a rigidly classical approach 
based on the "plain meaning" 1 0 5 of the language read within the 
confines of the document. 
Consideration of the origin of the language at issue in Broad I I 
shows that rigid adherence to standard usage readings led the court 
to overlook inherent vagueness and ambiguity in bond contract lan­
guage. The language in question was first formulated in the 1920's, 
at about the time that Florida became the first state to permit cash 
mergers. 1 0 6  I t  was many years, however, before cash consideration 
statutes achieved general application. Although California followed 
Florida in 193 1 , 1 0 7 it was not until 1961 and 1967, respectively, that 
New York and D elaware followed suit. 1 0 8 At the time the trust in­
denture in Broad II was executed in 1967, the issuer's  state of incor­
poration, Iowa, did not provide for cash mergers. 1 09 
Since, for all intents and purposes, cash out mergers did not ex­
ist in the 1920's, 1 1 0 the anti-dilution language in Broad II could not 
originally have been formulated with a cash out merger in mind.  Of 
. . . into the kind and amount of shares o f  stock and other securities and property receivable 
upon such . . .  merger." 642 F.2d at 949. 
Kaplan finds standard form merger cia uses such as that at issue in Broad so general as to 
be incapable of yielding predictable results. Kaplan, supra note 7,  at 16. According to Hills: 
"[I]t has been found impossible to draft a satisfactory provision protecting the conversion 
privilege . . .  from dilution upon the issuance of additional shares by a successor company." 
Hills, supra note 7,  at 36. 
1 04. 642 F.2d at 948-51. 
105. By "plain meaning" the Broad I I and other courts in bond cases refer not to the 
classical corollary to the parol evidence rule under which extrinsic evidence of meaning is 
excluded when the contract language is elear on its face, see E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, § 
7.12 at 501-03 ( 1982) ,  but to the primacy of interpretation according with standard usage and 
the various rules of interpretive preference. See, e.g., B.S.F. Co. v. Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 
42 Del. Ch. 106, 204 A.2d 746 ( Sup. Ct. 1 964 ) ;  Mueller v. Howard Aircraft Corp. ,  329 I ll. App. 
570, 577-78, 70 N.E. 2d 203, 206-07 ( 1 946 ) ;  Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 622 S.W. 2d 239, 247, 
250 ( Mo. App. 1981 ) .  
106. Act o f  JW1e 1 ,  1925, cb . 10 ,096, § 36, 1925 Fla. Laws 134 (current version a t  FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 607.214 ( West 1977 ) ) .  
107. General Corp. Law, ch. 862, § 361, 1931 Cai . Stats. 1809 ( current version at 
CAL. CORP. CODE § l l O l ( d )  (West 1977 ) ) .  
108. See WeiBS, The Law of Take Ou;, Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 5 6  N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 624, 637-41 ( 1981 ) .  New York first permitted cash consideration in the context of short 
iorm mergers ( involving utility companies only) in 1936. Id. at 641 . New York extended its 
statute to include all corporations in 1949 and in 1961 authorized cash, long form mergers. 
Delaware enacted a short form statute, modelled on New York's law, in 1957, then extended 
the statute to include iong form mergers in 1967. Id. 
109. 642 F.2d at 951 .  Iowa amended its law to permit cash consideration in i970. 
The Fifth Circuit correctly notes in Broad I I that the unavailability of cash mergers is 
not a credible basis for determining that the parties did not "intend" cash to fall within the 
scope oi "property" in the merger provision. I d. ·when the problem occurs to no one, there is 
no subjective intent. 
110.  The c.ase oi Florida corporations is taken as de m'inimis. 
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course, it reasonably might be inferred from the language's verbatim 
survival for five decades, from the gradual proliferation of the cash 
out merger, and from expectations of literalistic judicial interpreta­
tion, that the language survives unmodified because of a conscious 
allocation of the cash out merger risk to the bondholders. But it just 
as reasonably might be inferred that the standard form's failure spe­
cifically to mention cash out mergers reflects decades of thoughtless 
use of the same form. Even today, cash consideration is only begin­
ning to be mentioned in the merger clauses of standard anti-dilution 
provisions. 1 1 1  
Another well-known convertible bond case, H arjj v .  Ker­
korian, 1 1 2 also shows the potential for extensive judicial interven­
tion. There a group of convertible bondholders unsuccessfully chal­
lenged 1 1 3 a large cash dividend as a breach of fiduciary duty. The 
case might better have been characterized as one of contract inter­
pretation. The governing contract, unlike the standard contract be­
ing drafted today, 1 1 4 contained no explicit provision covering cash 
dividends. Thus viewed, H ar.ff is a garden variety "omitted term" 
case in which interpretation shows only that the parties failed to 
provide any contract term relevant to their dispute. 1 1 5  On this anal-
1 1 1 .  The modifications reinforce the Broad II result by adding cash as a type of 
"other property." Approximately half of the indentures surveyed in connection with the prep­
aration of this Article, see supra note 75, included a modified version of the language at issue in 
Broad. The most popular technique is addition of the phrase "or cash" after the phrase "other 
property." 
1 12. 324 A.2d 215 ( Del. Ch. 1974) ,  rev'd, 347 A.2d 133 ( Del. 1 97 5 ) .  
1 13.  The Chancery granted a motion to dismiss on the grounds that no fiduciary 
duty obtained, and that the bondholders in any event assumed the risk of an issuer dividend 
policy designed to destroy conversion value. 324 A.2d at 219,  222. The Delaware Supreme 
Court reversed,  looking again at the complaint and construing it to allege "fraud. "  Both 
courts agreed that a "fraudulent" dividend was actionable by the bondholders. Unfortu­
nately, neither attempted precisely to explain the concept of fraud intended. Since the possi­
ble meanings of "fraud" in the Harff context range from a traditional misrepresentation, 
through fraud on creditors, to a constructive fraud close in nature to the breach of a corporate 
duty of loyalty, the Harff opinions remain difficult to decipher. 
1 14 .  Of the 46 indentures surveyed for this Article, see supra note 75, 35 permit cash 
dividends out of surplus without adjustment, while 1 1  permit all cash dividends without ad­
justment. Forty-four of the 46 provide pro rata adjustments for spin-otis and other distribu­
tions in kind. 
The relevant provisions of the Model Indenture are §§ 1 3-6 ( B ) ( 3 ) ,  Alternate 1 and 13-
6( C ) ,  Alternate 1 .  ABF CoMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 546, 547. See also Model Simplified 
Indenture, supra note 69, at 766-67 (Sample Provision 10 .08) .  
1 15.  RESTATEMENT ( SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 ( 1981 ) provides: "When the par­
ties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a term 
which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is reasonable in 
the circumstances is supplied by the court."  For discussion of this provision, &..OB Speidel, Re­
statement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 785 ( 1982 ) .  
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ysis, no doctrinal barrier prevented the Harff court from filling the 
gap with a term protecting the bondholders. 
The courts' normally safe assumption that standard bond con­
tract provisions reflect exact allocations of risk proved to be unsafe 
in both Broad II and Harff. Much of the justification for interpreta­
tion based on standard usage readings and internal structural analy­
sis disappears along with that assumption. 
As the inquiry in such cases is opened to encompass circum­
stances from outside the four corners of the document, it becomes 
more difficult to justify any one meaning as "plainly" advancing the 
parties9 expectations. 1 1 6 Consider the evidence presented above re­
garding the meaning of the language at issue in Broad I I. It permits 
conflicting inferences to be drawn, 1 1 7 so that it cannot be said that 
one meaning more probably protects expectations. To resolve such a 
case, the court must intervene on the basis of external, substantive 
considerations, either ethical or economic. 1 1 8 
1 16.  Of course, if inquiry into the circumstances produces evidence that a given 
meaning in fact is attached by the parties, that meaning should prevail.  For consideration of 
the case where the bondholders attach one meaning and the issuer a different meaning, Se€ 
Bratton, supra note 93, at 376-77. 
1 17. Cf. Broenen v. Beaunit Corp., 440 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1 97 0 ) ,  which concerned 
the same anti-dilution provisions as Broad. The case involved a triangular merger. Literally 
applied, the standard form merger language was adverse to the holders' tax interests. !d. at 
1245-46. 
Here, as in Broad, the standard language applies without apparent ambiguity or vague­
ness when construed within the four corners of the document. But here consideration of the 
entire circumstances reinforces the conclusion in favor of the issuer. These bondholders, unlike 
those in Broad, retained an unimpaired equity participation in the combined entity. More­
over, the tax risks at issue customarily are allocated by means of explicit representations, 
opinions of counsel a;1d other similar devices. The standard public convertible bond transac­
tion lacks these tax trappings. And since so many standard and mass produced tax transac­
tions exist, even uninformed L·westors would be unlikely to form expectations of issuer respon­
sibility ior tax results concerning the bonds. 
If the contract itself did not provide an answer in this case and the question were open 
to judicial intervention, bondholder protection might make a great deal oi sense. This 
merger's structure entirely serves the parent's interests; triangular mergers result in signifi­
cant cost savings, here obtained at the expense of an adverse tax result for the bondholders. 
For another case distinguishable from Broad as a matter of interpretation, Se€ Prescott, Ball & 
Turben v. LTV Corp., 531 F. Supp. 213 (S.D .N.Y. 198 1 ) .  
This is not to say that extrinsic evidence o f  the history of the standard form o r  the 
market's understanding of the language in question always is persuasive. For an instance in 
which an interpretation within the four corners of the document properly vras held to out­
weigh an interpretation with outside backing, Se€ Wood v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 401 A.2d 
932, 939-40 ( Del. 1979) .  See also Judah v. Delaware Trust Co., 378 A.2d 624, 630 ( Del. 1 977) 
(preferred stock of Shanghai Power & Light) ,  for effective use of extrinsic evidence. 
1 18. This is the process traditionally called "construction." The Broad II court rec­
ogllized its necessity, at least su.b silentio. The "plain meaning" veneer in Broad I I masked the 
substantive judgment that the holders "got what they paid for." And the court followed its 
interpretive ruling with an unnecessary defense of the ruling's factual fairness. 642 F.2d at 
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Some recent interpretation cases dealing with the residual risks 
of dilution and destruction reached this level of substantive discus­
sion only to make pointed citations to Parkinson v. West End Street 
Railway1 1 9  and reaffirm allocation of the drafting burden to the 
bondholder. The cases took this approach even while paying all due 
obeisance to the notion that good faith duties apply to all promis­
ors. 1 20 Their analysis centered upon both the expectations of con­
vertible bondholders and issuers and the needs of the bond mar­
ket. 1 2 1 As to expectations, the courts reasoned that bondholders 
make a "knowledgeable gamble" from an equal bargaining posi­
tion 1 2 2  and bear only the risks they pay to bear. As for the market, 
certain and consistent constructions are essential to its smooth oper­
ation. Staying with the classical approach preserves these expecta­
tions and keeps bond contracts out of the hands of unpredictable 
juries. 1 2 3 
This continued classicism regarding convertibles accords with 
the courts' traditional treatment of all debt securities, providing no 
rights other than those expressed in the contract. 1 24 From a broader 
perspective, one perceives a judicial tendency to leave the classical 
allocation of the drafting burden in place in contract contexts in-
956-57. Other gratuitous discussions of the equities appear in Wood v. Coastal States Gas 
Corp.,  401 A.2d 932, 942 (Del. 1 979) ( dilution of convertible preferred stock by spin-off) ; and 
B .S.F. Co. v. Philadelphia Nat'i Bank, 42 Del. Ch. 106, 204 A.2d 746 ( Sup. Ct. 1%4) ( dilution 
of convertible bond by sale of substantially all assets) .  
1 1 9. 173 Mass. 446, 53 N.E. 891 ( 1899 ) .  See supra note 57 and accompa,.'l.ying text. 
120. Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 680 F.2d 933, 951-52 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (Adams, J. ,  dissenting) ,  cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 1 03 S.Ct. 475 ( 1983) ; Broad v. 
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 957-58 ( 5th Cir . )  ( en bane) ,  cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 
( 1981 ) ;  Kessler v. General Cable Corp., 92 Cal. App. 3d 531, 544, 1 55 Cal. Rptr. 94, 103 
( 1979) .  The Restatement Second's good faith provision applies to "every contract." RESTATE­
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 ( 1981 ) .  
121 . The Broad I I court accomplished this b y  using a plain meaning approach which 
effectively prevented a finding of ambiguity, and thus, a good faith issue from a..rising. 642 
F.2d at 940-57. See also Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 680 F.2d 933, 951 
(3d Cir. 1982) (Adams, J., dissenting) ,  cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 1 03 S.Ct. 475 ( 1983 ) ;  Levine 
v. Chesapeake & O.R.R., 60 A.D.2d 246, 249-50, 400 N.Y.S.2d 76, 79 ( 1977 ) .  
122. See, e.g. ,  Kessler v .  General Cable Corp., 9 2  Cal. App. 3 d  531, 544, 155 Cal. 
Rptr. 94, 1 03 ( 1979 ) .  
123. This is the Broad II view, 642 F.2d a t  947-48 n.20. 
A related doctrine calls for "strict" application of the bond contract's procedural provi­
sions. See, e.g., Timpone v. Concord Enters., 93 Misc. 2d 691, 693, 403 N .Y.S.2d 457, 459 
(Sup. Ct. 1978) (strict adherence to time limitations on the face of bond ) .  
124. In the convertibie bond context, see Harff v .  Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 2 1 5  ( Del. Ch. 
1974 ) ,  rev'd, 347 A.2d 133 ( Del. 1975).  For a case concerning straight bonds, see Wolfensoh11 v. 
Madison Fund, Inc., 253 A.2d 72 ( Del. 1969) (no good faith duty to extend participation in 
new investments to holders of income bonds 2Jter holding company reorganization ) .  
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volving large amounts of money and parties sophisticated in busi­
ness and finance. 1 2 5 
A small but growing body of case law reverses the classical pre­
sumption, invoking good faith notions to place the drafting burden 
on the convertible bond issuer where its actions benefit the stock­
holders by diminishing the value of the conversion privilege. This is 
done without a great deal of explication. At best, the courts tell us 
that the good faith duty protects the parties' expectations in the 
fruits of the contract, and the issuer action in question deprives the 
bondholders of those fruits. 1 2 6 
All of these opinions rest on judicial intuitions concerning fair­
ness and efficiency. These in turn rest on fragmentary pictures of the 
relationship created by the convertible bond contract. Indeed, the 
emergence of conflicting judicial approaches hardly comes as a sur­
prise. The relationship is complex enough to yield substantial justifi­
cations for both approaches. A more coherent judicial allocation of 
risks requires a more thorough understanding of the entire circum­
stances of the contractual relation. The following subpart provides 
this. 
B. A New Look at Judicial Allocation of the Risks of Convertible 
Bondholding 
As previously discussed,  neoclassical interpretation under the 
good faith rubric permits, but does not compel, creation of a com­
mon law of bondholder protection for cases where the bond contract 
125. See Berman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Practices in 
International Trade, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1413,  1416-17  ( 1963) ;  Farnsworth, Omissions, supra 
note 62, at 884-86. 
126. See Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp. ,  614  F.2d 418,  430 (5th Cir. 1980 ) ,  vacated, 
642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. ) ,  cerl. denied, 454 U.S. 965 ( 1981 ) ;  Van Gernert v. Boeing Co.,  553 F.2d 
812, 815 (2d Cir. 1977 ) ,  a.ff'd, 444 U.S. 472, ( 1980 ) ;  Van Gernert v. Boeing Co. , 520 F.2d 1 373, 
1383, 1 385 (2d Cir. ) ,  cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 ( 1975 ) .  In two similar cases j udges called for 
close scrutiny when issuers act to prejudice the interests of subordinated security holders. See 
Judah v. Delaware Trust Co., 378 A.2d 624, 628 ( Del. 1977 ) ,  citing Zahn v. Transamerica 
Corp ., 162 F.2d 36 ( 3d Cir. 1947 ) .  
This good faith strain has shown u p  clearly only i n  the last decade o r  so. Even so, a few 
older cases incline toward placement of the drafting burden on the issuer. See, e.g.,  Merritt, 
Chapman & Scott Corp. v. New York Trust Co., 1 84 F.2d 954 ( 2d Cir. 1950) ;  Mueller v. 
Howard Aircraft Corp. ,  329 I ll. App. 203, 70 N.E.2d 203 ( 1946) .  (Since Merritt was decided, 
the financial community has developed unambiguous standard terms covering stock divi­
dends, see ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 2,  at 546 ( Sample Provision § 1 3-6( B ) ( 3 ) ,  Alter­
nate 1 ) ,  and has made it clear that anti-dilution protection protects the underlying shares' 
economic value and does not insure a percentage of the total number of underlying shares. )  
See also Stephenson v. Plastics Corp. of America, 276 Minn. 400, 150  N.W. 2 d  668 
( 1 967 ) (spin-off) .  Cf. Carey v. Rothman, 55 Wis. 2d 732, 200 N.W. Zd 591 ( 1 972) ( employee 
stock option; creation of holding company) .  
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fails clearly to allocate all risks. This subpart takes up the resulting 
question of whether such judicial intervention is morally and eco­
nomically justified in the circumstances of the convertible bond rela­
tionship . To this end, it draws a detailed picture of the expectations 
of the disparate group of investors in convertible bonds, focusing on 
their informational sophistication respecting residual risks of dilu­
tion and destruction and its relationship to the market pricing of 
bonds. The effects of judicial intervention on the costs of drafting 
bond contracts, as well as the costs of pricing and trading bonds are 
considered.  This subpart concludes that Parkinson 1 2 7  now safely 
can be overruled and the drafting burden placed on the issuer, at 
least in cases where the bondholder can be afforded relief through 
adjustment of the conversion price or transfer of the conversion 
privilege to the common stock of a successor issuer. 1 2 8 
1 .  BONDHOLDER EXPECTATIONS AND BONDHOLDER INFORMATION 
LEVELS 
Some legal commentators characterize the bond investor as one 
who makes investment decisions based on six or seven standard fea­
tures conveniently su.mmarized by a financial service like Moody's 
Bond Survey, without scrutinizing other matters pertaining to the 
bond contract. 1 2 9 Such an investor makes decisions in ignorance or 
conscious disregard of the existence of the residual risks of dilution 
and destruction. Even an investor who checks the prospectus1 30 of 
127. Parkinson v .  West End St. Ry. ,  173 Mass. 446, 53 N.E. 891 ( 1899) .  See supra 
note 57 and accompanying text. 
1 28. Thus, the presumption would not give the bondholders a right to block a liqui­
dation which is to be followed by a dissolution. Short of forcing the issuer to stay in business or 
awarding speculative damages based on the deprivation of "upside" participation in future 
equity, complete relief is afforded in a dissolution by the standard anti�dilution provision's pro 
rata right to convert into whatever the stockholders receive in the dissolution proceedings. 
It  should be noted that only a rule of construction is proposed. To the extent that the 
bond contract expressly and clearly puts all or part of the risk of dilution or destruction on the 
bondholders, the presumption does not operate. 
The question whether the courts ever justifiably might override an explicit allocation of 
risk to the bondholders in the context of a publicly traded bond is treated infra notes 186-259 
and accompanying text. 
129. See Liewellyn, supra note 7 1 ,  at 721; cj. Chirelstein, To1JJards a Federal Pidu.ci� 
ary Starulards Act, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 203, 218 ( 1981 )  (investors in stocks optrate on gro.:s 
assumptions regarding management conduct ) .  
130. Mandatory disclosure of the existence of the residual risks at least might ame­
liorate this investor ignorance. Yet neither the �uri ties Exchange Commission nor the New 
York Stock Exchange requires such disclosure. The survey of pro.'ipectuses respecting con-­
vertibles newly issued between October 1, 1981 and September 30, 1982 done in conne-.::tion 
with the preparation of this Article show-s that 8. uniform practice prevails. The anti-dilution 
proviSions are accurately, but literally, summarized in the main body of the ptospe·::tus. Their 
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an issue, will find no warnings of residual risks and will indeed be 
surprised when a merger impairs conversion value six months later. 
This investor ignorance of the residual risks implies investor expec­
tations that the conversion privilege purchased with the bonds will 
survive for their full term. 
Services and handbooks directed to prospective convertible 
bond investors support this picture of investor expectation. They 
caution the investor to check the call provisions and to check that 
the bond contract contains standard anti-dilution provisions, but 
they do not warn the investor of the shortcomings shared by all 
standard provisions. 1 3 1  
The financial economic literature also fits this picture. I n  con­
cocting theoretical valuation models for convertibles, financial econ­
omists tend either to ignore residual risks of dilution and destruction 
entirely or, while recognizing their relevance, nonetheless find them 
unsuited to their models. 1 3 2  
import with respect to risk allocation, however, is not discussed. As a result, the prospectus, 
taken alone, dispels no misconceptions concerning the scope of anti-dilution protection. 
For criticism oi the descriptions of anti-dilution provisions contained in prospectuses, 
see Kaplan, supra note 7, at 27 & n.37; 12 VALUE LINE CONVERTIBLES 1 05 ( Sept. 2 1 ,  1981 ) .  
The N ew York Stock Exchange's listing requirements, although requiring that notice of 
expiration of conversion rights prior to maturity be placed on the bond,  New York Stock 
Exchange Company Manual § A12( I ) ,  do not require notice of possibilities of dilution and 
destruction. 
131 .  Graham, Dodd and Cottle's ciassic text for analysts recommends a check to 
make sure anti-dilution provisions are included in the trust indenture. The text goes no farther 
than that in detailing risks of dilution and destruction. See B. GRAHA1.1, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, 
supra note 7, at 615 .  T. NODDINGS, THE Dow JONES-IRWIN GUIDE TO CONVERTIBLE SECURI­
TIES 10 ( 1 973) ,  goes a few steps further. 
Value Line Convertibles, which describes itself as the o.ll-in-one service for convertibles 
and warrants, pubiishes bi-weekly a table describing all publicly traded convertible bonds. 
One item covered is anti-dilution protection. Most issues are designated as havi.ng "full pro­
tection." But "full protection" means only that the bonds are subject to anti-dilution provi­
sions fully adjusting for stock splits and stock dividends. See 3 VALUE LINE CONVERTIBLE 
SURV. 203, 204 ( June 19,  1972) .  
Finally, Moody's Bond Survey analyzes new issues as they appear, without noting 
residual anti-dilution risks. See, e.g. ,  73 MOODY's BOND SURV. 603, 646, 699, 760, 761,  763, 
769, 805, 826 ( 1 981 ) .  
132. See Jennings, supra note 23, a t  3 4 ,  and Wei!, Segall & Green, supra note 23, at 
446, 448, for studies which recognize the risk but leave it out of the model. 
The more recent "contingent claims" valuation studies, see supra note 28, ignore the 
risks entirely. See, e.g., Brennan & Schwartz, Analyzing Convertibles, supra note 2 1 ,  at 9 1 3- 14, 
924-25. 
Of course, theoretical valuation models are based on perfect markets assumptions 
which do not obtain in the real world.  See, e.g., Ingersoll ,  Contingent Claims, supra note 23, at 
292-93. The models nevertheless are relevant evidence. Despite their theoretical character 
economists devise them with an eye towards real world usefulness. Cj. Brennan & Schwartz, 
Analyzing Convertibles, supra note 2 1 ,  at S07--08 ( extending theory to cover more complex real 
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The picture's accuracy is  further supported by the results of an 
elaborate empirical study of the variables affecting convertible bond 
premiums. The study suggests that convertible bond prices are in­
sensitive to variations in the degree of anti-dilution protection. 1 3 3  
Other more casual observers make the same point. 1 3 4 Similarly, 
market professionals-underwriters, brokers and traders respond­
ing to a questionnaire distributed in connection with another 
study-reported that a substantial number of investors buy con­
vertibles without understanding even their fundamental investment 
characteristics. 1 3 5  
Not all investors lack knowledge of the existence of residual 
risks, however. The investor who regularly reads a special converti­
ble bond reporting service like Value Line should be well aware of 
the limited protection afforded by standard bond contract provi­
sions. Value Line provides reports on diluent and destructive issuer 
actions such as calls, stock dividends, recapitalizations and cash out 
mergers, and occasionally runs pieces explaining anti-dilution provi­
sions in detaii thus warning investors of their limitations. 1 3 6  The 
existence of Value Line and its $300 plus annual subscription price 
fairly imply the existence of a class of well-informed investors in 
convertibles. 
This does not imply that such a class makes all bond investment 
decisions with complete knowledge, however. Even a sophisticated 
investor rationally might determine that the costs of ascertaining 
and evaluating the residual risks exceed the benefits accruing in the 
form of a more accurate valuation. 
Moreover, even if an investor does know that residual risks ex­
ist,  it does not automatically follow that the investor's expectations 
perfectly accord with actual rights under the bond contract. The in­
vestment community becomes aware of some latent residual risks 
only as events point to their existence. Value Line, for example, had 
to modify and expand its coverage of the residual risks to account 
world conditions) ;  Ingersoll,  Corporate Call Poltcies, supra note 35 (modifying model to :::over 
observed suboptimal call policies) .  
1 33. Jennings, supTa note 23, at 34. 
1 34 .  See Kaplan, supra note 7 ,  a t  27--28. Kaplan, upon inquiry made to market pro­
fessionals, found that the market made no apparent pricing distinctions between issues with 
conversion price-based and market price-based anti-dilution clauses. 
135. M. TENNICAN, CONVERTIBLE DEBENTURE..<; AND RELATED SECURITIES 33 
( 1975 ) .  Berle and Means, reierring to warrants, observed the market's shortcomings five de­
cades ago. A. BERLE & S. MEANS, s·upm note 5 1 ,  at 201 .  
1 36. See 1 2  VALUE LINE CONVERTIBLES 1 0 5  ( Sept. 2 1 ,  1981 ) ;  3 VALUE LINE CON­
VERTIBLE SURV. 201 ( June 19, 1972) ;  1 VALUE LINE CONVERTIBLE BOND SERV., 1 ( Dec. 9, 
1968 ) .  
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for new developments respecting mergers. I ts commentary on dilu­
tion problems around 1970 either ignored mergers or noted the pos­
sibility that a merger might adversely affect the conversion pre­
mium. 1 3 7 In the mid-1 970's, however, a number of cash out mergers 
occurred which destroyed the value of outstanding warrants and 
thereby demonstrated the vulnerability of convertibles. Value Line 
and other commentators 1 3 8  asserted that the allocation of the risk of 
cash out mergers to the holders was unjustified. It  demanded that 
"investor confidence be restored" and "the . . .  stock exchanges 
. . .  take the initiative and make full protection a condition for list­
ing." 1 3 9 The stock exchanges and the drafters of new trust inden­
tures never met these demands, however, and by 1 980 Value Line 
was content to note only the existence of the merger risk and to rec­
ommend that bondholders pay close attention to pending takeovers 
and mergers. 1 40 
The foregoing evidence permits a rough differentiation of bond­
holders into groups according to their levels of informational sophis­
tication. The best informed investors go into the first group.  These 
investors, although not necessarily conscious of all remote diluent 
and destructive contingencies, at least know that the class of risks 
exists. For purposes of contractual fairness analysis, these bond­
holders' expectations are qualified by knowledge of the residual 
risks. 
Occupying a middle level are investors well-informed enough to 
know of the more obvious risks placed on the holder by the bond 
contract, such as call and subordination to other indebtedness. 
These holders incur some costs in monitoring for bond contract 
risks, but they are unaware of the residual risks. To the extent that 
they are at all aware of the possibility of dilution and destruction, 
they assume that the issuers bear the risk. 
At the bottom are investors in over their heads. These investors 
are entirely unaware of standard bond contract provisions, such as 
call rights, which make investment in the conversion privilege an 
especially risky venture. These investors also are unaware of the 
special need for monitoring investments in convertibles. 
1 37. See VALUE LINE CONVERTIBLE BOND SERV. 1 ,  3 ( Dec. 9, 1968) ;  2 VALUE LINE 
CONVERTIBLE SURV. 289 ( Mar. 22, 1 97 1 ) .  
138. See T. NODDINGS, supra note 1 3 1 ,  a t  168-80; N .Y. Times, Aug. 4,  1974, § 3 ,  at 
13,  col. 1. Both suggested SEC action. 
139. 5 VALUE LINE CoNVERTIBLE SURV. 265, 268 ( Apr. 15, 1974) .  See also 3 id. at 381 
(Jan. 1, 1973) .  
140. 1 1  VALUE LINE OniONS & CONVERTIBLES 105, 1 08 (Sept. 15,  1980 ) .  
1984:667 Convertible Bonds 703 
The corporate lawyers who draft convertible bond contracts 
and,  presumably, the underwriters and issuers they represent, also 
can be differentiated according to their respective levels of informa­
tional sophistication. Information concerning residual risks is read­
ily available to anyone in the corporate bar or the financial commu­
nity prepared to listen. Yet the bar and the financial community 
continue to use a standard form that fails to allocate these risks. 
The "good faith" clauses discussed above1 4 1 could remedy the 
residual risk problem by placing such risks on the issuer. But such 
clauses did not appear in any of the trust indentures surveyed for 
this Article. A minority of counsel did modify the standard form, 
but did so to p lace all residual risks clearly on the bondholders. 
Twenty-five per cent of the indentures surveyed provide that no 
anti-dilution adjustments may be made except as explicitly required 
by the anti-dilution provisions. 1 42 Given the straightforward draft­
ing choice that residual risks thus present, it must be inferred that 
most trust indentures either are mindlessly marked up by drafters 
unaware of the form's limitations or are marked up by drafters who 
see the problem but leave the risk unallocated . 
While these different pictures do not provide a complete work­
ing model of bondholder expectations, they do suffice to show the 
inaccuracy of the model used by the courts in which every investor 
on the bond market clearly grasps and foresees the residual risks, 
applies the classical risk allocation approach, and values the bond 
accordingly. The justification that "they got what they paid for" 
must be questioned, at least in part, because "they" are a disparate 
group . Although all investors have access to information concerning 
the residual risks, different individual investors in fact possess differ­
ent amounts of information. Bondholders accordingly lack a unitary 
set of expectations. 
These pictures also begin to justify invocation of good faith 
principles to protect bondholders from the residual risks. Allocating 
the residual risks to the bondholders tends to frustrate their expec­
tations, in every case where the bondholder is unaware that the 
residual risks exist, and, where the residual risk is latent, in the case 
of a well-informed bondholder as well. Where the bondholder is un·� 
informed, diligence in gathering available information could have 
141 .  See supra note 92  and accompanying text. 
142. See, e.g., Trust Indenture, betwe€n National Medical Enterprises, Inc. and 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, Truste€, § 10 .12 ( Nov. 30, 198 1 )  ( on file with 
author) .  It is noted that good faith clauses tend to be included in contracts coverii1g privately 
placed convertible securities. See Debevoise, Plimpton, Investments in Convertibles, supi a 
note 79, at 17 .  
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prevented the bondholder's expectations from exceeding bond con­
tract protections. Yet, this apparent fault can be balanced against 
the issuer's own lack of diligence. Bondholder expectations persist­
ently outpace contract protections and are frustrated by remote 
risks. We can ascribe to the issuer knowledge of this, since it has a 
direct role in the drafting process. The issuer thus can be faulted for 
failing to correct these mistaken expectations with a bond contract 
that is crystal clear . 143 It is not immediately apparent which party, 
the uninformed holder or the lackadaisical issuer, is more at fault, 
and further inquiry does not promise a clear answer. 
Once fault is put aside we can focus on frustrated bondholder 
expectations. If  we accept the above evidence that convertible bond 
prices are insensitive to residual risks, it turns out that the bond­
holders have not been compensated by lower bond prices for bearing 
the residual risks. Thus, protecting bondholders against the residual 
risks could be justified on the grounds that they are entitled to the 
benefit of their bargain. 
2. EFFICIENT BOND MARKETS 
The above case for bondholder protection is based on an incom­
plete picture of convertible bond pricing. A very different picture 
obtains under the theory of efficient capital markets, particularly on 
the question of compensation for bearing residual risks. 1 44 An "effi­
cient" market price fully reflects all available information. The se­
curities markets are efficient because free competition results in the 
generation, dissemination and digestion of information about the se­
curities traded on them. 1 45 
Since the bond market is efficient, the theory tells us t hat bond 
prices reflect full information of residual risks. In an efficient market, 
the best-informed traders scan bond contracts for shortcomings in 
the protection of the conversion privilege. Then, making the gener­
ally accepted 1 46 economic assumption of symmetric market ration-
143. See Bratton, supra note 93, at 374-77, discussing reason to know and fault 
ascription in bond contract interpretation. 
144. See, e.g. ,  Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 964 n.l ( 5th Cir. ) ( Hen­
derson, J. ,  concurring in part and dissenting in part) ,  cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 ( 1981 ) .  
145. See, e.g.,  E. FAMA & M .  MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 335-36 ( 1972 ) ;  R .  
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF  LAW 315-21, 324-26 ( 2d e d .  1977 ) .  For a cogent summary, 
see Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a 
Tender O.ffH, 94 HA..'\V. L. REV. 1 16 1 ,  1 165-66 & nn. 14, 15 ( 1981 ) .  The competitive process 
keeps price and value in line because arbitragers rush in to bid up or down the price of the 
security whenever new information material to its value reaches the market. I d. 
H6. Smith & Warner, supra note 3, at 1 1 9. 
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ality, 1 47 they project the likelihood of future diluent issuer actions 
and discount the value of the bonds accordingly. They further scan 
for provisions requiring issuer notice of actions affecting the value of 
the conversion privilege, project the monitoring costs necessary to 
overcome any shortcomings in them, and discount the bond price to 
compensate for these costs . 1 48 All these activities cause prices to re­
flect the residual risks fully and compensate all bondholders for 
bearing such risks, whether or not the risks figured into their indi­
vidual expectations. Arguably, then, judicial protection of contrary 
bondholder expectations is unjustified, and allocation to the bond­
holders of the burden of drafting against the residual risks is consist­
ent with good faith. 
This efficient markets model is too simplistic, however. It must 
be modified to account for all the valuation variables which arise out 
of the real world body of information concerning the risks of holding 
convertibles. 1 49 For example, the model's assumption that the best­
informed investor will assume symmetric market rationality may 
not be sound. We have already seen that the laxity of issuers in exer­
cising call rights implies a largess toward bondholders at odds with 
symmetric market rationality. 1 5 0 Similar largess has been shown in 
cash out mergers. Some acquiring corporations have offered settle­
ments to warrantholders, even though their investments otherwise 
would have been rendered valueless because the warrant's exercise 
price exceeded the cash price per share under the merger. 1 5 1  Other 
acquiring corporations have offered partial compensation and still 
others no compensation at al1 . 1 5 2 A model based on symmetric mar­
ket rationality would be inaccurate to the extent that "irrational " 
1 47.  For discussions of symmetric market rationality and security pricing, see Smith 
& Warner, supra note 3, at 1 1 8-19, and Anderson, supra note 1 ,  at 750-51 .  
1 48. The role of monitoring costs in security pricing is discussed in Jensen & 
Meckling, supra note 3, at 338. 
1 49. Empirical evidence both supports and contradicts efficient markets theory. See, 
e.g.,  E. FAMA & M. MILLER, supra note 145,  at 336. Barry, The Economics of Outside Informa­
tion and Rule l Ob-5, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1 307, 1 330-54 ( 1 98 1 ) ,  reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the efficient capital markets hypothesis. Barry conciudes: "[A]lthough 
the market appears reasonably efficient at reflecting historical price information in current 
prices, the evidence suggests that it is less efficient with respect to current developments and 
noticeably inefficient with respect to non-public information." Id. at 1348. 
150.  See supra text accompanying notes 43-48. 
1 5 1 .  3 VALUE LINE CONVERTIBLE SURV. 381 (Jan. 1 ,  1973 ) ;  3 VALUE LINE CONVERT­
IBLE SURV. 130, 1 32 ( Aug. 28, 1972 ) .  Value Line attributes this to issuer recognition of the 
equities of the holders' case. 
152. 4 VALUE LINE CONVERTIBLE SuRv. 89, 92 ( Oct. 1 .  1 973 ) ;  3 VALUE LINE CoN­
VERTIBLE SURV. 381 (Jan. 1, 1973 ) .  
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motives, such as the sense of fair play, led acquiring corporations to 
take less than full advantage of the bondholders. 
Whatever the acquiring corporations' motivations, the very 
possibility of more than one outcome results in yet another valua­
tion variable for the efficient market's pricing mechanism. The best 
informed investor in convertibles would have taken this range of 
possibilities into account in assessing the destructive potential of the 
residual risks. Since this modification decreases the expected magni­
tude of the residual risks, recognition of it theoretically should result 
in a higher bond price. 
This modified picture is still one in which the market discounts 
the bond price in recognition of the issuer's right to take diluent ac­
tions, thereby compensating the bondholder for bearing the residual 
risks. That the market also offsets the discount with the p ossibility 
that the issuer voluntarily might not enforce these rights neither ne­
gates the existence of these rights nor alters the logic of imposing the 
risk of their exercise on the bondholders, because the efficient market 
compensates them for bearing such risk. 
But this analysis is affected if the model is further modified to 
account for uncertainty in the outcome of judicial interpretation of 
contract terms. Contemporary courts differ in their approaches to 
allocating the residual risks. 1 5 3 However remote the resulting set of 
contingent outcomes may be for a particular bond, they create yet 
another real world pricing variable for the best-informed investor. 
Since dilution and destruction continue to be possible outcomes 
under this variable, the efficient market price still compensates the 
bondholders for bearing the risk. Nevertheless, the fairness picture 
changes because the variable also includes the risk that a court will 
allocate residual risks to the issuer. The bond price reflects both pos­
sibilities. If occasional judicial allocation of the risk to the issuer 
cannot be found unfair, the efficient markets model thus leads to a 
"fairness neutral" result. 
Substantial objections can be raised against using even this 
modified efficient markets model as a device for resolving this fair­
ness question. If the bondholder "expectations" to be protected are 
neoclassically conceived as the total set of reasonably held individ­
ual understandings regarding rights under the bond contract, and 
the total set of individual valuations based on such understandings, 
then the efficient markets model fails to consider all relevant factors. 
By looking solely to the price level set by the best-informed investor, 
the model ignores possible differences in the subjective risk prefer-
153.  See supra notes 12-17, 1 1 9-26 and accompanying text. 
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ences of individual investors. If the less informed investors were 
more risk averse, they would pay less for the security if made aware 
of the residual risks. As to them, therefore, the model's market price 
would be too high. Even under efficient markets theory, therefore, 
they cannot be said to have "gotten what they paid for . " 1 54 
A similar point can be made regarding the monitoring costs of 
investors having bond portfolios of different sizes. Incurring the 
$300 per year cost of a Value Line subscription plus the cost of the 
time spent reading the service each week would be rational for an 
investor with a $ 1 0 , 000 , 000 convertible bond portfolio, but would 
not be rational for an investor owning one convertible bond with a 
$ 1 000 face value. Since the large investor efficiently can minimize 
the residual risks through monitoring and diversification, the same 
$ 1 00 0  face value bond will be worth more to it than to the small 
investor even though b o t h  investors  have identifical risk 
preferences. 
Finally, it must be noted that the model elaborated above is 
based on the strong version of the efficient markets model. 1 5 5  Other, 
weaker versions in the economic literature permit construction of a 
pricing model falling somewhere in between the efficient markets 
model and the touchstone picture discussed above with respect to 
differing bondholder sophistication. 1 5 6 For example, Grossman and 
Stiglitz recently formulated a model in which prices only partially 
reflect the information level of the most sophisticated trader. The 
price becomes more informative as the number of well-informed in­
dividuals trading the security increases. The price is completely ac­
curate only if all traders have full information. 1 5 7  
1 54.  This risk-preference based criticism runs u p  against the "capital asset pricing 
model."  According to this model, the prices of assets in the capital markets adjust until assets 
with equivalent risks have the same expected rates of return. See generally Modigliani & 
Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return: Concepts and Evidence, 30 FIN. ANAL. J. 68 ( 1974 ) .  
Commentators have noted that the model provides cold comfort t o  an investor who, out of 
ignorance, errs in assessing the riskiness of an investment. Cf. Jennings, supra note 23, at 52, 
where an entire valuation model for convertible bonds is limited by the factor of investor risk 
preference. 
1 55. See Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE L.J. 1 604, 1617 
( 1971 ). 
1 56.  See supra text accompanying notes 1 24-43. 
1 57. See Grossman & Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Mar­
kets, 70 AM. EcoN. REV. 393, 393-95 ( 1980 ) .  The strong version's assertion that the price 
reflects the information level of the best informed trader is based on an assumption of competi­
tive equilibrium. The Grossman and Stiglitz modification instead assumes an "equilibrium 
degree of disequilibrium." 
The Grossman and StigEtz model has great intuitive appeal to anyone who resists the 
strong efficient markets assertion that costs incurred in developing market information are 
wasted. The model holds out the possibility that these expenditures will be rewarded. 
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Under this model, convertible bond prices do not reflect all  of 
the risks assumed by the bondholders unless all investors are fully 
informed regarding such risks. The less informed the investor group, 
the higher its expectations and the higher the bond price. The more 
distorted the price, the greater the disappointment of bondholder 
expectations when the issuer takes diluent or destructive action. 
The more palpable the denial of expectations, the stronger the case 
for allocating the risk to the issuer. 
Regardless of the accuracy or usefulness of the weaker efficient 
markets model, it does permit one point to be made in the present 
context. Given the suppositions of neoclassical contract law, strong 
efficient markets theory is too blunt an instrument to be adopted as 
a fairness guide respecting the relationship governed by a public­
issue bond contract. Only a model sensitive to differing b ondholder 
information levels will differentiate bondholder expectations with 
sufficient accuracy to resolve a controversy turning on conflicting 
interests of bondholders and issuers. 
3. FAIRNESS IMPASSE 
If actual bondholder expectations are aggregated and netted 
out and the resulting average expectation taken as the relevant one, 
then the traditional strict contract law approach can be defended as 
an accurate reflection of compensated bondholder expectations, 
even under the weaker efficient markets model. Since institutions 
hold most convertible bonds, 1 5 8 it reasonably can be inferred that 
most convertible bonds are held by well-informed investors. Analyz­
ing this fact under the weaker efficient markets model, and assuming 
that convertible bond prices are sensitive to allocations of the 
residual risks, leads to the conclusion that prices largely take ac­
count of residual risks and that the bondholders bear them . 
The flaw in this defense of the traditional approach is the aver­
age of bondholder expectations on which it is based. Under this view 
the expectations of holders at lower information levels cannot be sin­
gled out for protection. This conflicts with one of the good faith doc­
trine's more attractive fairness precepts-that the reasonable expec­
tations of all parties be protected to the greatest extent possible. 
The expectations of the uninformed bondholders are viable can­
didates for protection. Under a weak efficient markets model, the 
uninformed holders will not be fully compensated ex ante for bearing 
the residual risks. They likewise will not be compensated for the 
158. See Alexander & Stover, supra note 29, at 36. 
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transfer of wealth to the stockholders which results from diluent or 
destructive issuer action. And as already seen, they are not cogniza­
bly at fault in expecting the conversion privilege to be unimpaired 
by the residual risks. 1 5 9  
But i f  w e  resolve interpretive questions concerning the residual 
risks against the issuer, we create new problems. This approach 
would protect the expectations of the uninformed holders, but it 
simultaneously would shift the residual risks away from the well­
informed bondholders who have been compensated for bearing 
them. This approach thus would effect a wealth transfer from the 
stockholders to the well-informed bondholders even while prevent­
ing a wealth transfer from the uninformed holders  to the  
stockholders. 
When the position of the issuer is taken into account the matter 
becomes more complicated still .  The issuer and its common stock­
holders are compensated for the conversion privilege at the bonds' 
initial issue when the underwriters pay the purchase money. If un­
derwriters are at the highest information level, then it follows that 
the price paid at original issue would come close to reflecting fully 
the residual risks. As the bonds later were traded on the market, 
however, institutions and individuals with less information would 
buy into the bondholder group and the bond price would tend less 
and less to reflect the residual risks. Any corresponding rise in the 
bond price would redound not to the issuer's benefit, however, but to 
the benefit of well-informed bondholders selling out to bondholders 
at lower information levels. 1 60 Thus, the existence of uncompen­
sated risks for some bondholders does not imply that the excess price 
such bondholders pay is received by the issuer. 
Finally, present uncertainty as to the direction of the courts 
further complicates the search for fairness. Resolution of this uncer­
tainty, whether in favor of issuers or holders, will result in wealth 
transfers. B ecause bond prices now reflect this uncertainty, a firm 
rule in favor of issuers would transfer value--the amount reflecting 
holders' hopes of a favorable ruling-to issuers. A firm rule the other 
way would transfer value to bondholders. An efficient market would 
account for the present majority rule favoring issuers and would 
price bonds expecting judicial placement of the residual risks on the 
holders. Thus the price rise in response to a bondholder protective 
1 59.  See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
160. In practice, the shortfall in compensation to the issuer would be larger still. 
Convertibles, like other bonds, tend to be underpriced at original issue in order to promote 
quick sale and reduce the underwriters' risk. See Alexander & Stover, supra note 29, at 37-39. 
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rule would be greater than the price decline in response to a rule 
favoring the issuer. Counterbalancing this is the historical tendency 
for bondholder expectations of anti-dilution protection to outpace 
the actual scope of the explicit protections in the standard contract 
provisions, even in the informed segments of the market. In addi­
tion, although the actual market response to new dilution problems 
cannot be predicted with certainty, historically the marketplace has 
responded to most of them by revising the standard form in the 
bondholders' favor. 
If the fair result in a case allocating risks among parties to a 
contract is the result that protects paid for expectations, then the 
above goes to show that such a case concerning convertible bonds 
does not admit a perfectly fair result.  Since a single bond contract 
governs the rights of different parties with different expectations, 
that contract is ill-suited to application of principles keyed to pro­
tect individual expectations. Selecting among the various possible 
approaches, then, is a matter of selecting a fair and workable ap­
proach falling somewhat short of the ideal result. 
4. ALTERNATE ROUTES TO THE FAIREST RESULT 
a. Individualized just'ice 
Some of these problems would be ameliorated if a court could 
tailor its relief to individual expectations, adjusting conversion price 
only as to bondholders whose expectations require protection. Each 
holder would receive what he or she paid for, and the issuer's expec­
tations would receive maximum protection. Such an approach, how­
ever, would reward ignorance and thereby lessen bondholder incen­
tive to gather information and to monitor bond market events. 1 6 1 
· In addition, individualized inquiry into expectations would involve 
inordinate time and expense, given large numbers of bondholders 
and the nebulous nature of inquiry into individual information 
levels. A rough-cut classification, such as a division between institu­
tions and individuals, could avoid many of these costs, but at the 
expense of accurate results. The clients of the incompetent institu­
tion would be penalized while t he sharp individual would be 
rewarded . 
1 6 1 .  This point is developed at length elsewhere. See, e.g. ,  Kronman, Mistake, Disclo­
suTe, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 ( 1978 ) ;  Levmon:, Securities and 
Se�rets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracis, 68 VA. L. REV. 1 1 7  ( 1982 ) .  
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Differing treatment of holders of the same bonds, whether indi­
vidually or by category, itself creates fairness problems. Just as dep­
rivation of paid for expectations is thought unfair under one line of 
contemporary values, so differing treatment of parties having the 
same status under a single contract is thought unfair under another 
line of contemporary values. 1 6 2 All other things being equal, per­
haps the benefits flowing from an individualized approach would 
surmount this "equal protection" objection. But all other things are 
not equal and weigh against an individualized approach. 
b.  Protection of the status quo 
Another way out of this fairness impasse might be to ignore al­
location of the drafting burden and to focus instead on the values at 
stake at the time the diluent or destructive action is challenged. The 
emphasis, accordingly, would shift from protection of expectations 
to preservation of the status quo. 
Under such an approach different results might be reached in 
sjmilar-looking cases. Consider again the cash out merger question 
raised in Broad v .  Rockwell International Corp. 1 63 The magnitude of 
the harm that cash out mergers cause convertibles greatly varies 
with the circumstances. At one extreme lies a case where, even at the 
cash out merger price, the per share conversion value substantially 
exceeds the conversion price. Here the merger's effect of cutting off 
further appreciation of conversion value does not seem especially 
unfair. The bondholders have received some or all of the capital ap­
preciation for which the issuer was compensated at original issue, 
the cash out price in all probability includes a premium over the 
underlying common's pre-merger market price, 1 64 and the bonds 
1 62. RESTATEMENT ( SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 1 1 (2 )  and comment e ( 1981 ) .  
1 63. See supra notes 1 01-05 and accompanying text. 
164. Mergers tend to benefit convertible bondholders of transferor corporations, giv­
ing them little legitimate cause for complaint. A stock-for-stock merger, for example, will 
enhance conversion values if synergistic or other gains increase the value of the combined 
entity. And whatever the form of the consideration paid to the transferor's stockholders, the 
debt value of its convertible bonds will increase if the acquiring corporation has a credit stand­
ing superior to that of the original issuer. This certainly was the case in Broad. See Broad II, 
642 F.2d at 935. 
Indeed, debt value may increase even if the acquiring corporation's credit standing is 
not higher than the original issuer's. The increased debt capacity of the combined entities may 
have a "coinsurance effect." The theory is that so long as the earnings streams of the two firms 
are less than perfectly correlated, the risk of default is reduced and borrowing capacity is 
increased. See Lewellen, A Pure Financial Rationale for the Conglomerate Merger, 26 J. FIN. 
521 ( 1971 ) .  See also Galai & Masulis, The Option Pricing Model arui the Risk Factor of Stock, 3 
J. FIN. ECON. 53 ( 1976 ) ;  Higgins & Scali, Corporate Bankruptcy arui Conglomerate Mergers, 30 
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were prime candidates for forced conversion through call in  any 
event. At the other extreme lies a case like Broad, where the issuer 
has performed poorly and debt value is higher than conversion value 
at the cash out merger price. 1 6 5  Here any damage to the b ondhold­
ers resulting from the freezing of conversion value is highly specula­
tive. Of course, so long as some slight chance remains that conver­
sion value will exceed bond value at some time prior to the bonds' 
maturity, the conversion privilege has a value that the merger de­
stroys. Such value will h ave been more theoretical than real,  
however. 
There exists a middle ground in which cash out mergers more 
palpably damage convertible bondholders. Consider a bond issue a 
year or so old and a cash out merger which freezes conversion value 
at a figure just under the conversion price. Here conversion value 
reasonably might have been expected to rise above the conversion 
price in due course. The merger thus deprives the bondholders of the 
chance for equity capital appreciation for which the issuer was com­
pensated at original issue.  M oreover, as a glance at the Figure will 
confirm, 1 6 6 freezing conversion value in this case will destroy a sub­
stantial conversion premium. 
With these three different cash out merger cases compare a case 
involving a spin-off of fifty percent of an issuer's assets where the 
anti-dilution provisions are silent on the matter of spin-offs. Here 
the balance of values more clearly favors the bondholders. An ad­
justment of the conversion price leaves the status quo in place; the 
division of value between the stockholders and bondholders remains 
unchanged even while the issuer action goes forward. C onversely, 
failing to protect the bondholders permits the stockholders to arro­
gate the value of the conversion premium to themselves without any 
justifying business necessity. 
It must be questioned whether preservation of the status quo is 
a value of sufficient moment to sustain a jurisprudence thus ridden 
with inconsistencies. Furthermore, this approach's unpredictable 
aspect detracts from its fairness and makes it inefficient. Since the 
outcome depends to a great extent on the valuation picture at the 
time of the issuer's action, it gives the market little guidance as to 
the outcome in the next case. If the marketplace takes expectations 
J.  FIN. 93 ( 1975 ) ;  Kim & McConnell, Corporate Mergers and the Co-Insurance of Corporate 
Debt, 32 J. FIN. 349 ( 1 977 ) ;  Smith & Warner, supra note 3, at 129. 
1 65. It is noted that a bondholder desiring an equity participation in the combined 
entity can sell the bond at the increased debt value and use the proceeds to buy common stock 
of the acquiring corporation on the market. 
1 66. See supra text following note 21 . 
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concerning judicial outcomes into account as a valuation variable, 
then judicial certainty facilitates the market pricing process. An ad 
hoc judicial approach increases the range of future possible values, 
making valuation more expensive and bond investment riskier. As a 
result, bonds become less valuable to risk averse investors. 1 6 7 Clear 
judicial rules and predictable judicial results increase the likelihood 
that both issuers and well-informed bondholders will appraise bond 
packages accurately and have their expectations satisfied over time. 
c. Reconstructed negotiation 
The same ad hoc aspect impairs the utility of yet another mode 
of devising a result according with the parties' expectations where 
the parties' actual expectations are unexpressed.  This mode has the 
judge insert the term that the parties would have negotiated had 
they thought about the unprovided for contingency. 1 6 8  
Applied t o  the standard form bond contract, this reconstructed 
negotiation amounts to judicial speculation as to the financial com­
munity's response to the allocation of the risk at issue---speculation 
likely to be more intuitive than informed. 1 69 Even a prediction 
grounded in knowledge of the financial community's assumptions 
and predilections would be very uncertain, given the erratic pattern 
of marketplace behavior in this context. Consider recent modifica­
tions of the standard form explicitly allocating residual risks. Spin­
offs now receive full anti-dilution prot-ection, 1 7 0 while the opposite 
result seems to be obtaining regarding cash out mergers. 1 7  1 Market­
place responses such as these resist the formulation of a predictive 
model. 
d. Fault 
Contemporary contract doctrine takes into account punish­
ment for fault and recompense for injury, as well as the more tradi-
167.  See Sharon Steel Corp. v.  Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1 048 
(2d Cir. 1 982) ,  cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 103 S.Ct.  1253 ( 1983 ) .  
1 68.  Williams describes this as the "non-logical" judicial implication o f  a term. See 
Williams, Language and the Law (pt. IV),  61 LAW Q. REv. 384, 400-04 ( 1945 ) .  
1 69. Cj. Farnsworth, Omissions, supra note 62, at 879. 
170. All but two of the 46 recent trust indentures surveyed in connection with prepa­
ration of this Article, see supra note 75, provided for conversion price adj ustments in case of 
spin-offs. 
1 7 1 .  AppiOximately half of the trust indentures in this Article's survey contained 
merger provisions redrafted explicitly to freeze conversion value to the cash consideration 
paid in the merger, thus ratifying the Broad II result.  See also Model Simplified Indenture, 
supra note 69, at 755 (Sample Provision 5.0 1 ) .  
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tional contractual objective of protection of expectations. A survey 
of the bond relationship for a party at fault ultimately points to the 
drafter. Faulting the drafter or, to use the contract law maxim, con­
struing against the drafter, 1 7 2 would seem not only to punish the 
culprit but also to place the drafting burden on the party best posi­
tioned to remedy the matter in subsequent transactions. 
Unfortunately, closer inspection shows that this fault analysis 
neither persuasively isolates the equities of bond disputes nor con­
tributes to bond market efficiency. The drafters at fault here are the 
underwriters and their counsel, who remove themselves from the re­
lationship immediately after its inception and are not parties to sub­
sequent contract disputes. Of course, the issuer could be faulted as 
against the holders as the only remaining party that might have in­
fluenced the drafting. Whether the issuer's lawyer might,  in the best 
of all possible worlds, have dealt with a remote contingency two, 
five, or ten years earlier, does not impress one as the most crucial 
circumsta.nce in what amounts to a pie-splitting contest between a 
group of public stockholders and a group of public bondholders, 
however. Furthermore, as already noted, 1 7 3 the issuer's fault in 
drafting an imperfect document is counterbalanced by the holders' 
fault in failing to educate themselves about such imperfections. 
Duties of care and sanctions for failure to meet them can be 
justified as prods prompting greater perfection in planning business 
arrangements. But the bond market does not seem to need such ju­
dicial prodding, at least with respect to risk allocation in trust in­
dentures. The large amounts of money at stake in the typical public 
bond issue and the financial community's custom of retaining emi­
nent counsel to draft bond contracts suggest that the standard form 
will be duly modified whenever serious drafting flaws come to light, 
irrespective of the mode of dispute resolution chosen by the courts. 
e. Bondholder protection 
The alternate approaches being unacceptable, the result is a 
choice between a rule in the issuer's favor, which does not protect 
the expectations of uninformed bondholders, and a rule in the hold­
ers' favor which does. 
Certainly, substantial reasons support the traditional rule 
favoring the issuer. Not the least among them is the still powerful 
ethic of creditor self-protection. The main parties in interest, issuers 
172.  See RESTATEMENT ( SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 ( 1982 ) .  
173. See supra text accompanying note 143.  
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and institutions , are  well able  to protect themselves, whether 
through contract provisions or through portfolio diversification. 
The small, unsophisticated investor occupies a somewhat incidental 
place in the overall picture. Furthermore, imposing a rule favoring 
the bondholders risks wealth transfers to all members of the bond­
holder group, no matter how well informed, at the expense of a pub­
lic stockholder group which might easily be comprised of a larger 
proportion of less informed investors. 
Even so, charity counsels selection of the bondholder protective 
rule. "we have here a publicly sold security so complex that even the 
financial theorists have failed to settle upon a common set of valua­
tion variables. ·Coupled with this complexity is the persistent phe­
nomenon of sudden material realignments in the relationship,  
springing from arcane contract p rovisions. Among the entire group 
of interested parties, the uninformed bondholders are the least well­
situated to accomplish self-protection against these risks. Thus, in­
vestor protective impulses such as those behind the federal securities 
laws come to bear, albeit with less than full force. Moreover, solici­
tude for the weak motivates extant good faith doctrine.  One modern 
maxim of contract construction directs courts to protect the reason­
able expectations of the average member of the public subject to the 
contract, despite any advantages given to similarly situated, but 
better informed contracting parties. 1 74 This principle encourages 
protection of uninformed investors despite resulting windfalls to so­
phisticated investors. 
Beyond this balancing of the different virtues of the interested 
parties lies a more conventional case for a bondholder protective ap­
proach. It is based on the overall structure of the convertible bond 
relationship, particularly its basic apportionment of value. As al­
ready indicated, the convertible bond creates bondholder claims 
against the issuer's equity in consideration of a lower interest rate. 
Unremedied diluent and destructive actions permit the issuer to re­
capture a potentially substantial part of the equity claim without 
refunding any portion of the bondholders' consideration. Nothing in 
the standard bond contract sanctions so fundamental a realignment. 
The flexibility the issuer supposedly seeks by including anti-dilution 
provisions certainly does not do so. So long as judicial bondholder 
protection only affords relief through adjustment of the conversion 
1 74. See RESTATEMENT ( SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 1 1  comment e ( 1 981 ) .  See also 
Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Varian.ce with Policy Provisiot>.,s, ( pt.  I ) ,  8:3 HARV. L. REV, 
961 ,  967 ( 1970 ) ,  recommending, as a corollary to the principle of resolving ambiguity against 
the drafter, t hat insurance policies be construed as laymen would construe them and not ac­
cording to the interpretation of sophisticated underwriters. 
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price or transfer of the conversion privilege, no inhibitions on issuer 
flexibility can occur. 
For an illustration of this point consider once more Broad v .  
Rockwell International Corp. 1 7 5 and the cash out merger. 1 7 6 The 
original issuer is worth more to the acquiring corporation to the ex­
tent its capital structure contains low coupon, fixed-rate debt, par­
ticularly in a period of rising interest rates. I t  is worth more still to 
the extent the acquiring corporation can lay hold to such advanta­
geous capitalization without conceding a claim upon its own equity. 
By allocating the merger risk to the bondholders, Broad II permits 
the stockholders to keep this slice of the merger pie, even though its 
very existence results from the obliteration of the bondholders' con­
tract claim against the original issuer's equity. Good faith principles 
counsel that the burden to justify such a substantial restructuring of 
the fundamentals of the contractual relationship lie with the party 
benefitted thereby, here the issuer. 1 7 7  
5 .  EffiCIENCY 
The fairness advantages of a bondholder protective approach 
must be weighed against the efficiency advantages of the traditional 
approach. As already noted, the traditional approach forced the de­
velopment of an efficient, if imperfect, standard form and has facili­
tated swift judicial decisions. 1 7 8 
175. 6H F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1980) ,  vacated, 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.)  ( en bane ) ,  cert. 
denied, 454 U.S.  965 ( 1981 ) .  
176. This Article's rejection of the Broad II approach respecting cash out mergers 
should not be taken as approval of the Broad I opinion. Broad I surveys the en tire trust inden­
ture and finds ambiguities where none exist-in the standard provision regulating supplemen­
tal indentures, for example. 614 F.2d at 427-28. On the fiduciary duty applied in Broad I, see 
infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text. 
177. This analysis can be applied to a number of different cases. See, e.g . ,  Kessler v.  
General Cable Corp. ,  92 Cal. App. 3d 531 ,  155 Cal. Rptr. 94 ( 1 979) ( tender offers ) ;  Levine v.  
Chesapeake & O.R.R. ,  60 A.D .2d 246, 400 N .Y.S.2d 76 ( 1 977) .  
This line o f  reasoning also may encompass Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 2 1 5  ( Del. Ch. 
1974 ) ,  rev'd, 347 A.2d 133 ( Del. 1975 ) ,  discussed supra notes 1 12-1 3  and accompanying text. 
Large, extraordinary cash dividends materially realign the relationship. Uninfom1ed bond­
holders are likely to have valued the bonds assuming continued "regular" sized dividends 
without awareness of the residual element of risk. See Model Simplified Indenture, supra note 
69, at 804-05. Of course a difficult line-drawing problem is presented. "Regular" dividends 
should not result in price adjustments. The informed market expects them, and a succession of 
small, judicially-mandated conversion price adjustments in the bondholders' favor over sev­
eral years might increase substantially and unexpectedly the value of the conversion privilege. 
But in any event this line drawing problem probably never will reach the courts. Today's 
standard form includes explicit dividend provisions. See supra note 1 14 .  
178. See supra notes 7 1-80 and accompanying text. 
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Further efficiency claims can be made for the traditional ap­
proach under the "costly contracting" hypothesis of financial theo­
rists like .Jensen and Meckling, and Smith and Warner. This holds 
out the possibility of an optimal set of financial contracts for each 
firm and suggests that standard form bond contracts may be opti­
mal. It asserts that bond contracts resolve stockholder-bondholder 
conflicts efficiently by causing management to maximize firm value 
while simultaneously reducing the monitoring and agency costs of 
the stockholder-bondholder relationship to the lowest level. The 
business covenants contained in bond contracts restrict self-inter­
ested stockholder actions that would decrease the bonds' value, and 
lower the costs bondholders otherwise would incur in monitoring 
stockholder conduct. In exchange for these bondholder benefits the 
issuer pays a lower interest rate. 1 7 9  
The costly contracting hypothesis can be expanded into a stan­
dard microeconomic argument against any departure from the legal 
status quo respecting a corporate financing device. In the context of 
convertible bonds the argument would be that judicial interpolation 
of bondholder protective terms, contemplated by neither the issuer 
nor the well-informed class of bondholders, disturbs this optimal 
contractual relationship , first, by imposing additional and unneces­
sary costs on the issuer, and second ,  by causing the transaction costs 
of modification of the standard form to obviate the judicial risk allo­
cation and restore certainty. Ultimately, the risk of costly judicial 
meddling to restrain self-interested issuer conduct not explicitly 
prohibited by the bond contract might cause the issuer to refrain 
from taking steps which increase the overall value of the firm. 1 8 0 
That an efficiency justification for contractual good faith doc­
trine does not obtain in the convertible bond context further sup­
ports this view. Good faith rules that shift the drafting burden to the 
179. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 3, at 337-39; Smith & Warner, supra note 3, 
at 120-22. 
180. The costly contracting hypothesis represents one side of an ongoing debate 
among financial theorists on the question whether the way in which the bondholder-stock­
holder conflict is controlled affects the total value of the firm. The Modigliani-Miller "irrele­
vance hypothesis" embodies the opposing view. Modigliani and Miller take the position that 
the value of the firm and its cost of capital are independent of its capital structure; the firm's 
value is determined solely by the capitalization of its earnings stream. See Modigliani & 
Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. EcoN. 
REV. 261 ( 1958 ) .  
I f  the Modigliani-Miller hypothesis is  correct, then the value of  the firm is  not at  stake 
when a court decides a question of stockholder-bondholder conflict. Only wealth transfers 
back and forth between bondholders and stockholders would be involved. Arguably, the Mo­
digliani-Miller hypothesis sanctions more aggressive judicial umpiring of bondholder-stock­
holder disputes, since only a wealth transfer is at stake. 
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party best able to protect itself are said to be efficient b ecause that 
party has the discretion to select the performance terms and can 
cheaply draft an express limitation to the overall good faith duty. 
The alternative, having the weaker party protect itself with an ex­
haustive list of express promises, costs more because that party 
lacks information concerning the other's discretion. 1 8 1  This sort of 
cost picture might obtain as between bondholders and issuers after 
the initial issue and sale of the bonds, but it would not necessarily 
obtain at the time the bond contract is drafted. At that point the 
parties would be the issuer and the underwriters, and an efficiency 
analysis of the allocation of the drafting burden between them 
would point to the underwriters, whose expertise in financial affairs 
would more than match the issuer's knowledge of its own future 
plans.  J\!Ioreover, whichever legal approach happens to entail the 
lowest cost, most of the necessary costs of clearly allocating the risks 
of dilution and destruction were incurred decades ago, when stan­
dard anti-dilution provisions were developed in response to the turn­
of-the-century cases. 
But since the basic costs of allocating the risks respecting con­
vertible bonds already have been incurred, adoption of a bondholder 
protective approach should neither result in the incurrence of any 
significant additional costs nor prove materially less efficient than 
the traditional approach's exclusive reliance on the drafting process. 
The protective approach proposed herein has a gap-filling character: 
it comes into play only when the contract fails to allocate a risk and 
yields to an explicit contract provision providing for a different re­
sult. Looking once again at the large amounts of money at stake and 
the eminence of the drafting counsel in each bond transaction, it 
safely can be assumed that any j udicial allocation of risk seriously at 
variance with expectations of issuers and informed traders promptly 
and explicitly would be overridden in subsequent bond contracts. 1 8 2  
O f  course, this extra bit of effort is costly. But if history is any guide, 
a bondholder protective result more often than not will prove conso­
nant with actual market expectations. lvforeover, some of these 
costs will be incurred in any event.  The very existence of litigation 
over an ambiguity in a clause in the standard form will cause the 
1 8 1 .  See Burton, supra note 6 1 ,  a t  393-94. 
182. Recent adjustments to the standard form to ratify the Broad I I result, see supra 
note 1 7 1 ,  show the responsiveness of the corporate bar to new problems with the standard 
language. 
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better informed and more cautious segment of  the corporate bar to 
redraft the clause to effect a precise result. 1 8 3 
With respect to bond contracts, then, efficiency requires judicial 
consistency and clarity more than judicial results perfectly accord­
ing with actual market expectations. The benefits of the traditional 
approach now having accrued fully, it safely can be abandoned in 
order to protect the expectations created by the well-drafted stan­
dard form, 1 84 so long as its efficiency yielding aspect is carried over 
into the new approach. With the ultimate power to allocate risks left 
in the financial community, occasional rulings at variance with mar­
ket expectations, while perhaps theoretically causing wealth trans­
fers between existing bond issuers and holders, will neither cause 
suboptimal bond contracting nor otherwise materially affect market 
efficiency. 1 8  5 
I I I .  JUDICIAL REALIGNMENT OF THE CONVERTIBLE BOND 
RELATIONSHIP-CONTRACT A VOIDANCE AND FIDUCIARY 
RESTRAINT 
Bondholder protective contract interpretation could never pro­
tect all bondholder expectations. It yields to the drafter, who will 
not necessarily be bondholder protective. Consider a change in the 
standard form favoring the issuer .  Bondholders may not pressure 
issuers and underwriters to redraft the contract, but may not, as 
well, adjust their expectations. Bondholders, either lacking in so­
phistication or rationally deciding to save on monitoring costs, may 
fail to review and assimilate the drafter's change. If this informa­
tional breakdown occurs, subsequent issuers will have little incen­
tive to offer a term more favorable to the bondholders. Since the 
bondholders are unlikely to notice such an issuer concession, they 
are unlikely to pay for it, thus removing any competitive incentive. 
The following discussion considers the proposition that such refrac-
1 83. The cautious lawyer knows that he cannot rely upon the next court to take the 
same view of the issue and in any event wishes to prevent litigation. See supra note 171  on the 
bar's response to the Broad litigation. 
1 84. The approach recommended in no way impinges on the integrity of manage­
ment's corporate law duty to advance stockholder interests, because it arises out of the con­
tract and remains subject to control by the contracting parties. 
The inquiry might be more subtle with a closely held corporation. Cj. Myers v. South­
ern Nat'! Bank, 21 N.C.  App. 202, 204 S.E. 2d 30 ( 1974 )  (closely held corporation buy-sell 
agreement provision for a stock option contingent upon the other stockholder's death ) .  
1 85.  The question arises whether bondholder protective gap fillers similarly should 
be formulated for other bondholder-stockholder conflicts. Obviously, the answer depends on 
the particular kind of bond contract provision at issue and the interests at stake. 
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tory bondholder expectations be protected through judicial avoid­
ance of bond contract provisions or fiduciary restraints on issuers. 
A .  Existing Case Law 
A fragmentary body of contemporary case law protects bond­
holder expectations through avoidance of convertible bond contract 
terms. These cases offer only conclusory reformulations of contract 
and fiduciary 1 86  principles to justify their approach. 
Broad I, 1 8 7 for example, experimented with simultaneous con­
tract and fiduciary duties. It imposed a good faith duty that over­
rode contract terms. Under the duty, evidence that the b ondholders 
expected the conversion privilege to remain intact for the life of the 
bond made a jury question of the fairness of the issuer's  diluent or 
destructive action, despite an explicit contract right authorizing 
such action. 1 8 8 Oddly, the accompanying fiduciary duty did not 
override contract terms. It was fully discharged by compliance with 
the bond contract's terms and violated only when the issuer com­
mitted a bad faith breach. 1 8 9 
The Second Circuit's Van Gemert v. Boeing Co. decisions 1 9 0 
shared this experimental quality and doctrinal confusion. 1 9 1  In  Van 
Gemert I, 1 9 2  the first of two opinions, the court imposed a "duty of 
1 86. See, e.g., Broad I, 614 F.2d at 424-25; Green v. Hamilton Int'l Corp. ,  437 F. 
Supp. 723, 726-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Green I) .  The Third Circuit's Pittsburgh Terminal opin­
ions deal 'Nith the fiduciary duty question in the context of a 1 0b-5 action. The plurality opin­
ion finds that the issuer-bondholder fiduciary duty provides the requisite state law duty to 
disclose. Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R. ,  680 F.2d 933, 941 ( 3 d  Cir. 1 982) ,  
cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 103 S.Ct. 475 ( 1 983) . See also Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. 
v .  DASA Corp. ,  560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977) (declining to impose fiduciary duty to disclose as 
a matter of federal law ) .  
Green v .  Hamilton Int'l Corp. ,  N o .  7 6  Civ. 5433, slip. o p .  ( S.D.N.Y. July 1 3 ,  198 1 )  
(Green II) ,  holds out the intriguing prospect that breach of fiduciary duty may be the most 
effective ground for convertible bondholder challenges to issuer misstateme�ts and nondisclo­
:mres. According to Green I I, showings of neither materiality nor scienter are required to make 
out a breach of the fiduciary duty. Proof of the fiduciary relationship and of the holders' conse­
quent dependence is sufficient. See id. at 33-36. 
187. Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp. ,  614 F.2d 4 1 8  ( 5th Cir. 1980) ,  vacated, 642 F'.2d 
929 ( 5th Cir. ) (en bane) ,  cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 ( 1981 ) .  
188. 6 1 4  F.2d at 430. The Broad I I  court rejected this approach, taking t h e  position 
that its interpretation of the contract in the issuer's favor precluded a good faith decision for 
the bondholders. 642 F.2d at 957-58. 
189. 6 1 4  F.2d at 430-31 .  See also Judah v. Delaware Trust Co., 378 A.2d 624, 631 
( Del. 1977 ) ,  placing the terms of the certificate of incorporation ahead of a duty to be solici­
tous of the interests of preferred stockholders. 
190. Van Gemert v. Boeing Co. ,  520 F.2d 1373 ( 2d Cir. ) ,  cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 
( 1975 ) ;  553 F .2d 812 (2d Cir. 1977) ( Van Gemert II). 
1 9 1 .  See also infra note 226. 
192. 520 F.2d 1373 ( 2d Cir. ) ,  cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 ( 1975) .  
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reasonable notice" on the convertible bond issuer, 1 9 3 determined 
that a set of standard provisions for notice of call did not measure up 
to the duty, and overrode the provisions. The court held that the 
notice provisions fell short in two respects. First, they did not ap­
pear in the bond itself, but were buried in the bond contract where 
unsophisticated investors were unlikely to see them. 1 94 Second, the 
actual newspaper notices provided for were inadequate to inform 
the unsophisticated bondholder "in Dubuque or Little Rock or 
Lampasas . "  1 9 5 According to the court, the unsophisticated 
holder 1 9 6  expects reasonable notice as well as capital appreciation 
"and it is his reliance on this expectancy that the courts will pro­
tect. " 1 9 7 
The court's theory in Van Gemert I appears to go a step beyond 
the Broad I court's enhanced good faith duty. Van Gemert I empha­
sized bondholder reliance, showing a tendency to conceive of the is­
suer-bondholder relationship in terms of the bondholders' depen­
dence upon the issuer as well as in terms of the bondholders' 
bargained for expectations. Concurring in his own opinion, the au­
thor of the Van Gemert I opinion took the reliance point yet another 
step closer to a fiduciary concept. Had he alone decided the case, he 
would have dispensed with a contract law rationale entirely and in­
voked an "underlying duty of fair treatment . . .  owed by the cor­
poration or majority stockholders or controlling directors and of­
ficers" to the bondholders. 1 9 8  Despite this, a second panel of the 
same court in a later phase of the same case 1 99 reverted to the con­
tractual idea of protecting bargained for expectations and labelled 
Van Gemert I a "good faith" case. 2 0 0  
193. 520 F.2d at 1383. A number of other cases arose on substantially the same facts 
as Van Gemert. The courts in each found issuer compliance with the trust indenture notice 
provisions to be decisive. See Abramson v. Burroughs Corp. ,  FED. SEC. L. REP. CHH [ 1 971-
1972 transfer binder] � 93,456 (S.D.N.Y. 1972 ) ;  Kaplan v. Vornado, Inc. ,  341 F. Supp. 212 
(N.D. I l l .  197 1 ) ;  Gampel v. Burlington Indus . ,  43 Misc. 2d 846, 252 N.Y.S. 2d 500 (Sup. Ct.  
1954 ) ;  Terrell v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp. ,  496 S.W. 2d 669 ( Tex. Civ.  App. 1973) .  In 
Kaplan and Abramson the plaintiff tried a lOb-5 theory, based in Kaplan on inadequate disclo­
sure in the debenture form and in Abramson on inadequate disclosure in the prospectus. 
Neither document was found to be materially misleading. 
194. 520 F.2d at 1383. 
195. Id. at 1379, 1383. 
196. The Van Gemert holders were hapless indeed. As the result of missing the call 
notice, the plaintiff failed to convert prior to the call date and thereby failed to realize on a 
substantial increment of conversion value over call price. 
197. 520 F.2d at 1385. 
198. Id. at 1382-83 n.19 ( Oakes, J. ) .  
199. Van Gemert II, 553 F.2d 812 ( 2d Cir.  1977 ) .  
200. Id. at 815.  
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Like Van Gemert I, the Third Circuit's Pittsburgh Terminal v .  
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad20 1  decision imposed a notice duty on 
the issuer based on overlapping good faith and fiduciary theories. 
The Pittsburgh Terminal issuer failed to give the bondholders ad­
vance warning of a large spin-off. Conversion prior to the record 
date for the spin-off would have been a value maximizing action for 
bondholders, because the governing anti-dilution clause did not pro­
vide for a conversion price adjustment in the spin-off's wake. 2 02 
Reading Van Gemert I and Pittsburgh Terminal together, we see 
an issuer duty to give adequate notice respecting matters material 
to the conversion decision. This particularized bondholder protec­
tive and contract overriding duty may be here to stay, whereas 
Broad I's more expansive imposition of fairness restraints directly 
on diluent and destructive corporate actions is not. Broad I I em­
phatically rejected Broad I and declined to extend Van Gemert I, but 
did not question the notice duty's validity. 
A similar distinction between notice and more broadly ranging 
fairness duties was drawn in the original sequence of cases re­
straining destructive issuer action, Zahn v. Transamerica Corp. 20 3 
and Speed v. Transamerica Corp. 204 In Zahn the Third Circuit im­
posed a fiduciary duty directly against the exercise of call rights by 
an issuer where the call negatively o.ffected conversion value, 20 5 but 
201.  680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1982 ) ,  cert . denied, _ U.S. _, 103 S.Ct.  475 ( 1983) .  A 
related case, Lowry v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,  7 1 1  F.2d 1 207 (3d Cir . ) ,  (en bane) ,  cert. denied, 
_ U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. 238 ( 1983 ) ,  saw the Pittsburgh Terminal panel's disagreements echoed 
by members of the court sitting en bane. See also Green I, 437 F. Supp. at 729 n .4; Green II, 
No. 76 Civ. 5433, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. July 13 ,  1981 ) .  
202. 680 F.2d at 936-38. Judge Gibbons' opinion treats the bondholders' claim under 
Rule 1 0b-5; the contract law duty to speak is utilized to provide the duty to speak required in 
a 1 0b-5 action by Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 ( 1980 ) .  
Judge Garth's concurring opinion avoids the contract good faith notice question by 
predicating the 1 0b-5 duty to disclose on Rule 1 0b-17. 680 F.2d at 944-,17 ( Garth, J. ,  
concurring).  
Judge Adams' dissent applies the Broad I I approach. The absence of contractual notice 
provisions or anti-dilution adjustments decides the good faith point: "By its terms, the princi­
ple of fair dealing . . .  applies only when one party infringes the other's rights 'to receive the 
fruits of the contract. '  Here, under the well-settled Parkinson doctrine, Pittsburgh Terminal 
had no right, under the contract, to receive advance notice of the . . .  dividend . . . .  " I  d. at 
951-52 ( Adams, J. ,  dissenting) .  
Under the analysis of this Article, the good faith issue would be decided in the bond-
holder's favor as a matter of contract interpretation. 
203. 162 F.2d 36 ( 3d Cir. 1 947) .  
204. 235 F.2d 369 ( 3d Cir. 1956 ) .  
205. Zahn and Speed concern an issue of preferred stock ( termed " Class A common" 
but preferred in all substantive respects) ,  convertibie into common (termed " Class B com­
mon")  on a one-to-one basis and having a two-to-one liquidation preference. At the time of 
the issuer action challenged in the case, conversion value substantially exceeded the call price 
and liquidation value substantially exceeded both. The is.suer, planning to liquidate, called 
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then backed away from this direct restraint in Speed, the damages 
phase of the same case. Speed affirmed the issuer's discretion to exer­
cise call rights in its own interest, and granted damages to the Zahn 
plaintiffs as if liability in Zahn had been based on the issuer's failure 
to notify them of material facts that would have prompted conver­
sion prior to the call date. 2 0 6  
Despite all the doctrinal avenues they travel, these cases fail to 
grapple directly with the basic issue they all share: whether the ben­
efits stemming from judicial protection of uninformed bondholders 
justify inefficiencies stemming from mandatory judicial regulation 
of the bond contract's allocation of risks. The following subpart con­
siders this issue. It concludes that courts should avoid overriding 
provisions which, like anti-dilution clauses, allocate substantive 
risks, but justifiably may impose additional notice requirements. 
B. Overriding the Bond Contract Under Contract Law 
Applying contract avoidance principles to bond contract provi­
sions seems a frivolous exercise at first . The drafter is generally as­
sumed to have the final world in competitive financial transactions. 
Standard form anti-dilution provisions fit into this mold-they re­
sult from on-going competition between issuers and investors and do 
not disproportionately favor the issuer . Barriers to the full circula­
tion of information do result in a vulnerable class of uninformed in-
the preferred without informing the holders of these values. The holders, under the impression 
that the call price exceeded conversion value, intentionally failed to convert prior to redemp­
tion. The . result, upon the issuer's liquidation, was a vastly increased participation for the 
common. Zahn, 162 F.2d at 38-41 .  See also Taylor v. Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co.,  295 Ky. 226, 
173 S.W. 2d 377 ( 1 943) .  
In Zahn, the Third Circuit imposed a fiduciary duty on the issuer not to redeem the 
stock at all, because the single largest common stockhoider controlled the issuer's board and 
the board's action benefitted the common to the preferred's detriment. In reaching this con­
clusion, the court sidestepped the governing contract provisions in the certificate of incorpora­
tion with a conclusory imputation to the certificate's drafters of an intention that the board 
act disinterestedly in calling the stock. Zahn, 162 F.2d at 46. 
The court's sidestep is indefensible. Whether the subject co!lvertibles are bonds or pre­
ferred, call rights necessarily embody a contractual reservation of a privilege to act in the 
interests of the common. Assuming no change in prevailing rates of interest, cail is rational 
only if conversion value equals or exceeds the call price. Zahn's fiduciary restrictions on calls 
advancing stockholder interests frustrates the intent of the drafter and in effect voids the call 
provision. 
206. Speed sustained an award of damages based on the liquidation value of the un­
derlying common and refused damages based on the liquidation value of the unconverted 
preferred. Speed v. Transamerica Corp. ,  235 F.2d at 374. 
Like the Van Gemert and Pittsburgh Terminal notification duties, the Speed duty admits 
of characterization as a product both of the issuer's contractual good faith duties and its fidu­
ciary duties. 
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vestors, but any resulting competitive imbalance is held in check by 
market pricing that responds to valuations mostly made by well­
informed investors. The competitive picture is drastically different 
in a classic avoidance case such as Henningsen v. Bloomfield Mo­
tors. 20 7 
Consideration of the bond contract's history, however, shows 
judicial control of bond contract terms to be a serious proposition. 
Llewellyn singled out financial contracts for regulation in his basic 
work on adhesion contracts. 2 0 8  And far from being held sacred ,  the 
terms of the public issue bond contract have been regulated inten­
sively by both courts and legislatures. Courts forced indenture 
trustees to assume fiduciary duties decades ago and in so doing over­
rode explicit exculpatory provisions in the bond contract. 20 9 The 
Trust Indenture Act of 1 939, 2 1 0 which applies to every public issue 
bond contract, prescribes verbatim inclusion of provisions contain­
ing minimum standards of conduct for the trustee. Both instances of 
regulation stemmed from a judgment of market failure to produce 
contractual mechanisms adequate to protect the bondholders' inter­
ests. 2 1 1  
Contract law avoidance doctrines stand ready to afford justifi­
cation should contemporary courts decide that further regulation of 
bond contracts is needed to protect bondholder interests. Not only 
the enhanced good faith principles invoked in Broad I and the Van 
Gemert opinions,2 1 2 but avoidance doctrines developed for adhesion 
207. 32 N.J. 358, 1 61 A.2d 69 ( 1960 ) .  There oligopoly power resulted in greatly une­
qual bargaining strength and a wholly one-sided form contract. 
208. Llewellyn, supra note 7 1 ,  at 733-34. 
209. See Dabney v. Chase Nat'! Bank, 196 F.2d 668 ( 2d Cir. 1952 ) ,  2 0 1  F.2d 635 ( 2d 
Cir. 1953) ;  York v. Guaranty Trust Co. , 143 F.2d 503 ( 2d Cir. 1944) ,  rev'd on other grounds, 
326 U.S. 99 ( 1945 ) .  Hazzard v. Chase Nat'! Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 287 N.Y.S. 541 ( Sup. Ct. 
1936 ) ,  is a leading case going the other way. See also Llewellyn, supra note 7 1 ,  at 733. 
210.  15  U.S.C. § 77aaa-77bbbb ( 1982) .  
211 .  See § 302(a) (6 )  of  the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77bbb(a) (6 )  ( 1 982).  See also SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE CoMM'N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVI­
TiES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES 2-3 ( pt .  
VI 1936). 
212. Never packaged for general application, the contract overriding good faith duty 
has been associated with employment contracts, see Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 
373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1 25 1  ( 1977), and insurance contracts, see Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 
66 Cal.2d 425, ,126 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 ( 1967) ;  Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.,  50 
Cal.2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 ( 1958) .  Both of these areas tend to entail greater bargaining dispar­
ity than does the typical public issue bond contract. 
See generally Burton, supra note 6 1 ,  at 372 n.l7,  394-95 n.l09. The duty is an extension 
of the traditional duty to cooperate in the other party's performance. See, e.g. ,  Barron v. Cain, 
216 N.C.  282, 4 S.E.2d 618 ( 1939) ;  Iron Trade Prod. Co. v. Wilkoff Co., 272 Pa. 172, 1 16 A. 
150 ( 1922) .  
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contracts2 1 3 are available. Bond contracts are inherently adhesive 
because the post facto nature of the holder's entry into the relation­
ship prevents all bargaining other than over price. The Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts provides a basis for small scale attacks on par­
ticular adhesive provisions in order to remedy informational dispari­
ties. 2 1 4  A bondholder could utilize it if, as seems plausible, it could 
be shown that convertible bond issuers have reason to know that 
many bondholders are uninformed regarding fine points in the bond 
contract, and that such provisions frustrate "dominant" bond­
holder expectations. 2 1 5 
1 .  D ILUENT AND DESTRUCTIVE PROVISIONS 
These neoclassical avoidance doctrines should not be applied 
too rigidly . Otherwise, they would create an avoidance case every 
time a contract term frustrates a party's reasonable expectations. 
They best are approached as invitations to painstaking relational 
inquiries into the fairness and efficiency of avoidance. Thus, in the 
convertible bond context the avoidance inquiry raises again all the 
conflicting considerations which went into the interpretation discus­
sion in Part I I  of this Article. 
We first consider the avoidance case respecting bond contract 
provisions permitting dilution and destruction. The case is close. 
Such diluent provisions frustrate bondholder expectations. These 
frustrated expectations are much smaller in magnitude than in the 
usual avoidance case. The group interested in the bond contract 
tends to be sophisticated, making cases of other mass produced fi­
nancial contracts, such as insurance policies, easily distinguishable 
because the unsophisticated general public has the primary stake in 
such contracts. 2 1 6 Even focusing solely on the expectations of unin­
formed bondholders, diluent and destructive actions only partially 
213. Both contract overriding good faith duty and adhesion contract avoidance doc­
trine commission the courts to protect the weaker party's expectations from the contract 
rights of the stronger party. They differ as to the means to that end. Adhesion contract doc­
trine looks at the terms of the writing and avoids hidden fine print found unacceptable in the 
overall circumstances of the contract relation. Good faith arises from the circumstances of the 
particular contract relation. It imposes duties independent of the terms of the contract and 
may override terms whether or not buried in hidden fine print. 
214.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 comment f ( 1981 ) .  
215. Carried to its logical conclusion, this approach would approximate Professor 
Keeton's rule for insurance policies: no qualifications inconsistent with expectations of a 
holder having an ordinary degree of familiarity with the type of instrument in question should 
be enforced. See Keeton, supra note 174, at 968-69. 
216.  Professor Keeton formulates an unconscionability rule which results in per se 
invalidation of provisions which mislead most insurance policy holders. Keeton, supra note 
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frustrate such expectations. 'Take an uninformed investor who p ays 
$1000 for a convertible bond una·ware of limitations on the conver­
sion privilege and expecting complete protection. Although such an 
investor would not manifest assent to the contract at a price of 
$1000 if he knew of the limitation, he might, depending on his risk 
preferences, manifest assent for $800 or $990. And even if an unex­
pected diluent event occurs, the bond's debt value limits the magni­
tude of his disappointed expectations. 
In addition to these individual benefits, avoidance increases in­
vestor confidence in the market. It also would reduce the agency 
costs of subsequent transactions, causing lower coupon rates. 2 1 7 
Now contrast the undesirable effects of judicial bond contract 
avoidance. First comes the wealth transfer phenomenon discussed in 
connection with bondholder protective contract interpretation. 2 1 8 
A voiding a term favoring the issuer will make the bond more valu­
able, transferring wealth from the stockholders to the bondholders. 
But the transfer will be greater in magnitude than in an interpreta­
tion case. Since avoidance concerns explicit terms rather than ambi­
guities and omissions, the market's valuation of the bonds will tend 
to reflect clear contractual expectations regarding the allocation of 
risk rather than uncertainty. 
Second, and perhaps more significant,  are the costs of the uncer­
tainty and technical problems caused by j udicial bond contract 
avoidance. The courts in theory would alter contract terms to con­
form to investor expectations. As a practical matter, however, 
courts do not have the resources to ascertain the actual expectations 
of a group of bondholders. But if they did , inquiry would show that 
even among the informed bondholder group no monolithic expecta­
tion exists for quick translation into a trust indenture provision. In 
the end,  therefore, the courts would be basing avoidance and substi­
tute provisions on intuition. Line drawing problems and conflicting 
judicial rulings easily could result, along with all associated costs. 
These uncertainty costs are likely to be higher than the uncer­
tainty costs of intuitive judicial interpretation. The yielding aspect 
of rules of interpretation make certainty the end result by returning 
174, at 974. In Keeton's view, some provisions a;:e so complex that they cannot be brought to 
hoiders' attention in the ordinary marketing situation. I d. 
217. The scenario is as follows. Bondholders come to expect judicial protection 
against opportunistic issuer conduct. Since judicial prctectiDn reduces the r.isks of holding 
bonds and the bond market is competitive, the return required on bonds declines. For discus­
sion of agency costs and judicial protection oi common stockhoiclers against management mis­
conduct, see Scott, Corporation Law and the A merican Law Instit·ute Corporate Governance 
Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927 ( 1983) .  
218. See strpm text accon;panying notes 1 58-60. 
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the subject matter to the marketplace for explicit treatment in fu­
ture bond contracts. Moreover, some interpretation is unavoidable, 
since there is no such thing as perfect drafting. In contrast, courts 
avoiding bond contract terms create uncertainty because the bond 
market cannot absolutely rely on the enforceability of bond contract 
provisions. Given case-by-case balancing of particular deprivations 
of uninformed bondholder expectations against issuer expectations 
and the need for certainty, even an efficient market would be hard 
pressed accurately to quantify the likelihood of avoidance. The re­
sulting uncertainty would reduce the bonds' utility as a financing 
instrument. 
Finally, even though judicial regulation of terms to protect 
bondholders reduces agency costs in future transactions, it may not 
improve on the standard form's efficiency. Costs or other factors 
may make the contract worth more to the issuer if a given risk is 
allocated to the bondholders than the contract is worth to the bond­
holders if such risk is allocated to the issuer. Since efficiency is a 
function of these subjective valuations of risk, judge-made terms 
formulated to protect the uninformed subgroup of bondholders are 
unlikely to be as efficient as standard terms formulated through the 
marketplace interaction of issuers, underwriters and informed bond­
holders. One may object that with an obscure risk there arises the 
real possibility of a widespread informational breakdown regarding 
the contract provision allocating it and the real possibility that such 
provision does not embody an exchange between the issuer and the 
bondholders at all, much less an efficient one. The problem is that 
courts have no practical way of confirming whether this sort of infor­
mational breakdown in fact has occurred.  
As a practical matter, of  course, the market could adjust to  all 
manner of disruption and uncertainty resulting from judicial avoid­
ance of bond contract terms.2 1 9  One suspects that only avoidance of 
fundamental terms, such as those setting interest rates and prepay­
ment rights, seriously would impair market processes and the utility 
of the convertible bond contract as a financing tool. A voidance of 
such terms is unlikely. The more fundamental the term, the less 
likely it is there will be a significant informational disparity regard­
ing it, and the less likely will be the need for judicial intervention on 
behalf of uninformed bondholders. 
219. Convertible bonds survived the treatment of turn-of-the-century jurists, which 
bespeaks a certain resiliency in the securities markets. See supra notes 55-62 and accompany­
ing text. But then so does their survival of federal regulation and the corporate governance 
movement. 
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Legislation promulgated by either Congress, the Securities Ex­
change Commission or the N ew York Stock Exchange could provide 
a better means of achieving bondholder protection than does ad hoc 
judicial avoidance. Any one of several legislative approaches could 
be taken. A statute or stock exchange rule might regulate contract 
terms, mandating express provisions in the manner of the Trust In­
denture Act. Such legislation, while removing the risk-allocating 
function from the marketplace, at least would not sacrifice the cer­
tainty of terms required for accurate market pricing. Alternatively, 
legislation might require the marketplace to inform the uninformed 
bondholder. This would require abandoning the present prospectus­
based disclosure model, with its hyper-technical descriptions of con­
tract language, and its exclusive focus on new issues. 2 2 0  The prob­
lem calls for delivering the simplest possible explanation of the risks 
of convertible bondholding to all  market purchasers of con­
vertibles. 2 2 1 Finally, the entire burden of educating investors prior 
to purchase of a convertible could be imposed on brokers through a 
particularized application of the SEC's suitability requirement. 2 2 2  
Since none of these legislative solutions is likely in the foresee­
able future, the judicial intervention issue cannot be avoided.  This 
subpart has shown that the problem stems not from any intrinsic 
unfairness in the standard form, but from disparate investor infor­
mation levels. 2 2 3 At least as regards anti-dilution provisions and 
other provisions allocating substantive risks, convertible bonds 
present a comparatively small information problem. Judicial inter­
vention, however, carries a cognizable risk of minor market ineffi­
ciencies. The balance falls against intervention. 
2. NOTICE 
The case for an issuer duty to give reasonable notice of actions 
bearing materially on the conversion decision is marginally stronger 
than the case for overriding anti-dilution and other substantive pro­
visions. The two cases share the objective of protecting bondholders 
from imperfect information dissemination, but differ in their means 
to this end. Avoidance of substantive provisions remedies the failure 
220. See supra note 130 for a description of the prevailing standards for prospectus 
disclosure of bond contract terms. 
221 . The model here is less the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z ( 1982) ,  
than the provisions o f  the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2303-2304 ( 1982) .  
222. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15bl0-3 ( 1 982) ,  which provides that market professionals 
making recommendations to customers have "reasonable grounds to believe that the recom­
mendation is not unsuitable for such customer . . . .  " 
223. See supra text accompanying notes 129-42. 
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of market information channels to make all contract risks clear to all 
investors prior to bond purchase by shifting the risks. In contrast, 
the notice cases leave the holder bearing the risk of the issuer action. 
They involve judicial intervention only to assure that the holder has 
the information necessary to take value-maximizing steps in re­
sponse. 2 24 
B oth the costs and the benefits of the notice duty are fewer than 
those respecting avoidance of substantive provisions. The benefits 
are reduced because the practical protective effect fluctuates with 
the market. However well-notified the bondholder, forced choice be­
tween conversion and redemption will be a Hobson's choice if the 
conversion price exceeds conversion value. The costs are reduced be­
cause notice duties create less of an uncertainty problem. Notice du­
ties lend themselves to precise statement and,  to the extent that 
lines need to be drawn, a highly developed jurisprudence provides 
guidance. Notice duties also leave management free to take 
whatever stockholder beneficial action it deems appropriate. 
This is not to say that notice duties will not confer unearned 
benefits on well-informed bondholders or disturb efficient allocations 
of risk. The standard form provides for advance notice of dividends 
out of surpius, rights offerings, mergers, large asset sales, recapitali­
zations, and liquidations, 2 2 5 in addition to the anti-dilution provi­
sions covering these events. Additional judge-made notice require­
ments therefore shift back to the issuer monitoring costs that the 
contract places on the holders. Theoretically, this disrupts the pric­
ing assumptions of the issuer and well-informed investors, causing 
yet another wealth transfer to well-informed investors. But this ef­
fect would be temporary. Furthermore, judicial notice duties cannot 
be particularly inefficient so long as their materiality standard has a 
basis in reality. If the information subject to the duty has economic 
significance to the bondholders, issuers will receive compensation for 
bearing the duty in subsequent transactions. 
224. The duty imposed in Speed and Pittsburgh Terminal in effect requires disclosure 
of inside information of management's intention to take action materially affecting conver­
sion values. See supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text. Van Gemert requires the issuer to 
ta!l.e steps to assure the widest possible dissemination of widely disseminated market informa­
tion. Thus, Speed and Pittsbu.rgh Terminal, like Rule lOb-5 and other federal disclosme re­
quirements, proted out3ide investors at all levels of sophistication, while Van Gemert, like 
other good faith based decisions respecting bond contracts, spacifically protects Uilinformed 
iw.:estors. 
225. See ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 2,  at 556-.57 ( Sample Provision § 13-10) .  
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In sum, the innocuous nature of the costs of judicially imposed 
notice requirements may make the resulting bondholder protective 
benefits worthwhile. 2 2 6  
C. Fiduciary Duties to  Convertible Bondholders 
In addition to extending the benefits of neoclassical contract 
avoidance principles to convertible bondholders, some of the case 
law imposes a fiduciary duty upon the issuer. 2 2 7 The following is a 
preliminary appraisal of this duty. 
1 .  FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO BONDHOLDERS AND TRADITIONAL NOTIONS 
OF CORPORATE STRUCTURE 
Clearly articulated doctrinal theories support excluding bond­
holders from the protection of corporate fiduciary duties. The tradi­
tional fiduciary duties of the corporation's directors, officers and 
other employees spring from their agency relationships with the cor­
poration. They are owed to the corporate entity as principal, rather 
than to individual stockholders or creditors. 2 2 8  Because the corpo­
ration is the beneficiary of these duties, it must be the plaintiff in 
actions to enforce them. 2 2 9  The stockholders' right to sue deriva-
226. One caveat based on Van Gernert should be entered. It  purported to protect 
uninformed investors by requiring a clearer description of notice provisions on the bond itself 
and publication of additional notices of call in a newspaper oi general circulation in Manhat­
tan between 30 and 90 days prior to the redemption date. 520 F.2d at 1376. One doubts that 
these additional notices actually would catch the unsophisticated investor's eye. Van Gernert 
naively supposes that the uninformed investor reads the fine print on the back of the bond and 
monitors the Wall Street Journal for call notices. At least one observer tells us that some 
investors sleep so deeply that only full registration, notification by certified mail and follow up 
telephone calls will flush out 100% of an issue for conversion prior to the redemption date. 
Miller, How to Call Your Convertibles, 49 HARV. Bus. REV. ,  May-June 1 97 1 ,  at 66-68. 
The case's result can still be j ustified as an ad hoc remedy for a particular denial of 
bondholder expectations. That the opinion lays down an unworkable rule, while not a point in 
its favor, is not much of an objection either. The costs imposed on issuers were trivial and the 
set of situations to which the rule was to apply was fast disappearing. 
227. See supra notes 1 86-206 and accompanying text. 
Neither Broad II, 642 F.2d at 940 n . 10 ,  958-59, nor the dissenting opinion in Pittsburgh 
Terminal, 680 F .2d at 946-52, 954 n . l l  (Adams, J . ,  dissenting) categorically rejects the propo­
sition that a fiduciary duty to the bondholders exists. Both contain a strong edge of skepti­
cism, however. 
228. See Clark v. Lawrence, 5 Fed. Cas. 888 ( C.C .D.  Ma.."S. 1856) (No.  2827)  ( Curtis, 
J . ) ;  Allen v.  Cochran, 160 La. 425, 1 07 So. 292 ( 1926) ;  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 
14C ( 1958) .  
229. Agents are not liable for harm to  persons other than their principals. RESTATE­
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 352 ( 1958 ) .  See also W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPO­
RATIONS 865 ( 4th ed. 1969 ) .  
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tively does not extend to creditors; 2 30 thus, creditors cannot enforce 
these duties. Furthermore, no fiduciary duties directly arise between 
the corporate entity and its creditors because no agency or trust re­
lationship exists between them; 2 3 1 the relationship is contractual. 
Taken together, the black letter proposition emerges that creditors 
have an inherently and exclusively contractual relationship with the 
corporation. 2 3 2 
Much of the force of this traditional analysis has dissipated 
under the weight of accumulated, often successful, challenges to its 
underlying assumptions. Consider first the weakening of other black 
letter divisions of corporate relationships into neat corporate and 
contract categories. Corporate law used to tolerate only limited con­
tractual alteration of the terms governing relationships between the 
corporation and its stockholders. 2 3 3  Today, at least with respect to 
closely held corporations, contractual arrangements between stock­
holders may restrict the exercise of management discretion granted 
under the pure corporate model in much the same manner as cove� 
nants in bond contracts have done all along. 2 34 
230. Courts have categorically rejected bondholder assertions oi standing t o  sue de­
rivatively for the corporation, see Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 218-19 ( D el. Ch. 1974 ) ,  
rev'd on other grounds, 347 A.2d 133 ( Del. 1 975),  even though stockholder and convertible 
bondholder interests often converge with respect to enforcement against management 
breaches of its duties of care and loyalty. 
Convertible bondholder and warrantholder derivative actions in federal courts assert­
ing claims based on the federal securities laws have met with more success. Federal investor­
protective policies are used to justify them. See Hoff v. Sprayregan, 52 F .R .D . 243 ( S.D.N.Y. 
1971 ) ;  Verrey v. Ellsworth, 303 F. Supp. 497 ( S.D.N.Y. 1969) ;  En tel v. Guilden, 223 F. Supp. 
129 (S.D.N.Y. 1 963 ) .  For commentary, see Levrnore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial 
and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 80-82 ( 1982) ; Note, Stockholder's Derivative Actions by 
Holders of Convertible Debentures, 6 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 760 ( 1 973);  Note, Hoff and Harff: Does 
the Convertible Debenture Holder have Standing to Maintain a Shareholder Derivative Action?, 26 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 730 ( 1 975);  Note, Creditors' Derivative Suits on Behalf of Solvent Corpora­
tions, 88 YALE L.J. 1299 ( 1 979) .  
231 .  See Briggs v .  Spaulding, 141 U.S. 1 32, 1 47 ( 1 891 ) ;  Allen v .  Cochran, 160 La. 
425, 1 07 So. 292 ( 1 926 ) .  
232. Note that creditors have limited liability because o f  their lack o f  management 
control. See generally Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting from Improper Interfer­
ence with the Management of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. LAW. 343 ( 1975 ) .  
233. The theory was that such agreements unduly impinged o n  the board of direc­
tors' discretion to operate the corporation. See, e.g., Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Bruns­
wick Theatres Co.,  297 N.Y. 174, 77 N . E .2d 633 ( 1 948) ;  McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N .Y. 
323, 189 N.E. 234 ( 1 934 ) .  Ironically, the cases undercut the strict contract view of creditor 
participation by putting the interests of creditors forward as one of the factors relevant to the 
question of the validity of imp inging agreements. See Galler v, Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 29, 203 
N.E. 2d 577, 584 ( 1%4 ) ;  Clark v. Dodge, 269 N .Y. 410,  415,  199 N . E .  64 1 ,  642 ( 1936 ) .  
234. The provisioP..s at issue i n  V/estland Capitol Corp. v .  Lucht Eng'g Inc., 308 
N.W. 2d 709 ( Minn, 1981 )  provide good examples. 
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Consider further the central point that corporate fiduciary du­
ties arise only out of agency relationships. Fifty years ago many 
courts permitted this point to block duties running from maj ority to 
minority stockholders, as well as duties from issuer to bondholder. 
The rule as to stockholders was similar to that applied to creditors: 
absent "fraud" stockholders owed one another no duties. 2 3 5  D espite 
the absence of agency relationships between the stockholders, this 
rule long since has yielded to a duty arising from the majority's 
power to control the business. 2 3 6  
No obscure doctrinal complications prevent a court from using 
the same control of assets rationale as the basis for extending fiduci­
ary protections to convertible bondholders. 2 3 7  Alternatively, a 
court could characterize the conversion privilege as an "equity" in­
vestment and draw a duty out of the bondholders' dependence on 
management's greater expertise and knowledge concerning the con­
duct of the business. 2 3 8 
Contemporary academic analyses of the nature of fiduciary du­
ties also undercut the traditional analysis. These extract generally 
applicable concepts of the essential fiduciary obligation from its par­
ticularized manifestations in agency and trust relationships. Profes­
sor Arthur Jacobson carries this line of analysis to its farthest point, 
defining the fiduciary obligation as the "exercise of judgment on be­
half of another ." 2 3 9 This flexible concept permits us to identify nu­
merous interrelating fiduciary obligations in corporate structures. It  
also permits us  t o  identify obligations arising in contractual rela­
tionships as fiduciary. Under this concept the convertible bond rela­
tionship is fiduciary: the issuer's investment of the proceeds of the 
235. See, e.g. ,  Palmbaum v. Maguisky, 217 Mass. 306, 104 N.E.  746 ( 19 1 4 )  ( forgive­
ness of note invalid as consideration for voting agreement as fraud on other stockholders ) .  
236. See N.  LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 169 ( 1971 ) .  
237. See Broad I, 614 F.2d at 430; Zahn v. Transamerica Corp. ,  1 62 F .2d 36, 46 ( 3d 
Cir. 1947 ) .  
238. See Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v .  Baltimore & O.R.R. , 690 F .2d  at  933, 941-42 
(3d Cir. 1982) (plurality opinion of Gibbons, J . ) ,  cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 1 03 S.Ct. 475 
( 1983 ) ;  Green I, 437 F. Supp. at 729; Green II, No. 76 Civ. 5433, slip op. at 33 ( S. D .N .Y.  July 
13, 1 981 ) .  
239. See Jacobson, Capturing Fiduciary Obligation: Shepherd's Law of Fiduciaries, 3 
CARDOZO L. REV. 519,  527 ( 1982) .  J .C.  Shepherd's definition is slightiy narrower: "A fiduciary 
relationship exists whenever any person acquires a power of any type on condition that he also 
receive with it a duty to utilize that power in the best interests of another, and the recipient of 
the power uses that power." J. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FiDUCIARIES 96 ( 1981 ) .  For other 
theories narrower still , but general nonetheless, see Shepherd's discussion, id. at 51-91.  See 
also Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 795 , 808-09 ( 1983 ) .  
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sale of the bond involves the exercise of judgment on behalf of the 
holders. 2 40 
Thus the traditional doctrinal analysis supporting the black let­
ter line that blocks extension of fiduciary protections to bondholders 
has given way. But it should be noted that some practical justifica­
tions against extending fiduciary protections to bondholders sur­
vive, albeit with substantially diminished force. One such justifica­
tion is the judgment that so long as the corporate debtor remains 
able to repay the debt, creditors' interests have not been impaired 
sufficiently to justify legal restraints on the corporation's self-inter­
ested actions. A different judgment is made regarding insolvent cor­
porate debtors. Because insolvency jeopardizes repayment,  the bal­
ance of interests shifts to favor the creditors, giving rise to creditor 
protection in law. 24 1 Thus, when the Delaware Chancery in Harff v. 
Kerkorian242 tells us that the black letter line yields to "fraud, insol­
vency or a violation of a statute, " 243 the "fraud" very well may be a 
fraud on creditors and the "statute" the legal capital provisions of 
the Delaware corporation law. 244 These rules restrain self-inter­
ested conduct of the corporation's affairs by management and stock­
holders for the creditors' benefit ,  just as corporate fiduciary princi­
ples restrain self-interested conduct of the corporation's affairs by 
management and controlling stockholders for the stockholders' ben­
efit. 24 5 
240. Cf. Jacobson, supra note 239, at 527-28, discussing the fiduciary nature of a sale 
of goods. It is less clear whether Shepherd's theory, see supra note 239, encompasses bond 
relationships. It would seem to depend on whether Shepherd's concept of power encompasses 
the investment of borrowed money. 
241 .  The point where balance shifts is identified in UNIF . FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE 
AcT § 5, 7A U.L.A. 161 ( 1978 ) ,  which provides as follows: 
Evr:ry conveyance made without fair consideration when the person making it 
is engaged or is about to engage in a business or transaction for which the property 
remaining in his hands after the conveyance is an unreasonably small capital, is 
fraudulent as to creditors and as to other persons who become creditors during the 
continuance of such business or transaction without regard to his actual intent. 
I d. at 237. Professor Clark notes that, literally applied, this provision vitiates corporate ac­
tions advancing stockholder or management interests taken just prior to insolvency. Clark, 
supra. note 5,  at 510 n .15 .  
Traditional state legal capital provisions also may restrict transfers of  assets out of  the 
corporation prior to insolvency. The degree of restriction depends on the structure of the cor­
poration's capital accounts and is subject to manipulation by the issuer and its stockholders. 
See generally B. MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL 84-90 (2d ed. 198 1 ) .  
242. 324 A.2d 215 ( Del. Ch. 1 974) , rev'd, 347 A.2d 1 33 (Del.  1975 ) .  
243. 324 A.2d at 222. 
244. See ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 21 .  
245. See Clark, supra note 5 .  The "normative ideals of fraudulent conveyance law" 
described by Clark, id. at 508-13, could be recast as the ideals of management and majority 
stockholder fiduciary duties. 
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No change in financial fundamentals has altered the interests of 
stockholders and creditors of solvent corporations so as to change 
the relative weights of the interests thus balanced. Even so, the con­
clusion that creditors deserve no legal protection other than that 
reserved in a contract no longer holds as an absolute proposition. 
Congress decided that bondholders deserve quite a bit of legal pro­
tection, at least so far as concerns their information levels, when it 
enacted the federal securities laws. By extending the federal securi­
ties laws' protections to bondholders as well as stockholders, 246 
Congress opened the door to further judicial traversals of the barri­
ers to legal protection of bondholders. Decades of pari passu federal 
law treatment of stockholders and bondholders24 7 have accustomed 
the courts to looking beyond the differences between the two and 
towards their common protective needs. 248 
Importantly, a justification keyed to the relative interests of 
stockholders and creditors only partially applies to hybrid securities 
like convertibles. The conversion privilege creates an additional 
bundle of bondholder interests to be thrown into the balance. One 
court, recognizing this, hit upon the neat solution of extending man­
agement fiduciary duties to convertible bondholders only in cases 
where the "wrongs alleged [impinge] upon the equity aspects . . .  [of 
the bond] ." 249 
246. Both the Securities Act of 1 933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77ddd ( 1 982) ,  and the Securi­
ties Exchange Act of 1 934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk ( 1 982 ) ,  accomplish full inclusion of debt 
securities by incorporating them in their respective definitions of "security. "  
247. I t  comes as n o  surprise that the universal citation t o  support the existence of 
fiduciary duties to creditors is an opinion of Justice Douglas, a major figure in the early history 
of the Securities Exchange Commission. The case is Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 ( 1939 ) ,  
which concerned the equitable subordination i n  bankruptcy of a judgment obtained b y  the 
controlling stockholder after the corporation became insolvent but before it declared bank­
ruptcy. Justice Douglas described quite strict "fiduciary standards of conduct which [the con­
trolling stockholder] owes the corporation, its stockholders and creditors. "  308 U.S. at 3 1 1 .  
Broad as the Pepper language may be, put i n  the context o f  the facts o f  the case i t  only 
supports the proposition that the law imposes duties to creditors on controlling stockholders 
after insolvency. This fundamental proposition has always constituted an exception to the 
state law contract and corporate law dichotomy. See supra note 241 .  Thus narrowly read, the 
case does not support duties to creditors prior to insolvency. 
248. There may be more common ground from the average investor's point of view 
than from the average corporate lawyer's point of view. According to Llewellyn: 
My eyes may be blinded, but to me men do not seem to regard as going to the essence 
(as distinct from questions of degree of security, and priority in rank) that the legal 
sanction in the case of bonds goes to payment of certain sums at certain times; while 
in the case of stocks the legal obligation is built around rather than focussed on pay­
ment, built in terms of limiting dissipation in terms of assets and checking manipula­
tion rather than in terms of specified positive performance. 
Llewellyn, supra note 7 1 ,  at 721.  
249. Green II,  No. 76 Civ. 5433, slip op. at 17 ( S. D . N  Y. July 13 ,  1981 ) .  
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An additional practical support for the black letter barrier to 
fiduciary protection of bondholders comes from the agency law 
maxim that an agent cannot fully serve two principals. 2 50 In the 
context of the corporate structure, the maxim tells us that fiduciary 
duties running from management to groups having dependent con­
tract relationships with the corporation, such as suppliers, custom­
ers, and creditors, ultimately conflict with and undermine manage­
ment's  fundamental duty t o  maximize returns to common 
stockholders. 2 5 1 
But even this justification no longer serves as an absolute bar. 
More than one generation of commentators by now have urged that 
the system of management duties centered upon single-minded de­
votion to stockholder interests be scrapped in favor of a system in 
which management takes a disinterested, conflict-resolving role for 
the benefit of all parties interested in the corporation, whether such 
interests arise contractually or otherwise. 2 5 2  
2. FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO BONDHOLDERS AND THE BOND CONTRACT 
The preceding discussion, showing that no doctrinal barrier 
bars fiduciary restraints from the convertible bond relationship and 
that the broadest notions of fiduciary obligation encompass the con­
vertible bond relationship, does not complete the inquiry. The 
properties of this particular fiduciary obligation remain to be 
identified . 
The following discussion projects the effects of applying fiduci­
ary principles to the convertible bond relationship. It turns out that 
fiduciary protections work at cross-purposes with the management­
stockholder relationship, once more confirming the maxim that an 
agent cannot fully serve two principals. It  also turns out that fiduci-
250. RESTATEMENT ( SECOND) OF AGENCY § 394 ( 1 958) embodies this principle. 
251 .  See, e.g. , Dodge v .  Ford Motor Co., 204 M ich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 ( 1919) .  
252. The positions of an earlier generation were put forward by Berle and Dodd. 
Compare A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 ( 1954) and Berle, For 
Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1 365 ( 1932) with Dodd, For 
Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees, 45 HARV. L. REv. l 145 ( 1932 ) .  For more recent views, 
see Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governa·nce System to 
Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 U. C.L.A. L. REV. 343 ( 1981 ) .  
Courts have taken such nonstockholder interests into account i n  sustaining manage­
ment action not in the stockholders' best interests. See, e.g., Herald Co. v. &awell, 472 F.2d 
1081 ( lOth Cir. 1972) ,  sustaining management action to avoid a takeover on the ground that 
the target's business of publishing a newspaper made it a "quasi-public institution" with 
"other obligations besides the making of a profit." Jd. at 1094-95. The case is criticized by 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 145, at 1 192: "A manager responsible to two conflicting 
interests is in fact answerable to neither." 
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ary protections work at cross-purposes with the bond contract's sys­
tem of risk allocation while resulting in a minimal flow of benefits to 
the bondholders, once more confirming the relative insignificance of 
the creditor interests at stake. Thus, the practical supports to the 
black letter barrier return to the fore and force strict delimitation of 
the scope of any issuer-bondholder fiduciary obligation. 
a. Fiduciary duties vs. bond contract terms 
Let us take management's investment and dividend policy as a 
test case for an issuer fiduciary duty. Stockholder and bondholder 
interests are in harmony concerning new investment out of retained 
earnings so long as the net present value of projected returns on the 
issuer's investments exceeds the issuer's cost of capital. B ut when 
such value falls below the issuer's cost of capital their interests con­
flict, with noninvestment and dividends promoting the stockhold­
ers' interests, and retained earnings and investment promoting the 
bondholders' interests. 2 5 3 The law sends a contradictory signal if it 
imposes a corporate law duty on management to maximize stock­
holders' returns and a fiduciary duty on the corporation owing to the 
bondholders. Unless resolution of the conflict is left to manage­
ment's discretion, the law must go a step further and direct that one 
or the other duty be given priority. 
Let us assume that the bondholder duty is granted p riority over 
the stockholder duty. In order for this bondholder duty to have any 
meaningful protective effect in the dividend and investment area, it 
must include a license for judicial avoidance of bond contract provi­
sions. The standard form permits cash dividends out of surplus. 
Given the prevalence of retained earnings financing, such a dividend 
could destroy the value of the conversion privilege. Thus, a bond­
holder duty appears to sanction judicial avoidance of bond contract 
terms. 
Fiduciary duties have an inherent tendency towards contract 
avoidance. One reason the law creates them is to restrain p ossibili­
ties for abuse in relationships where one party dominates events be­
cause of its superior knowledge, and because the other p arty de­
pends on it to make judgments in that party's best interests. 2 5 4 
Vvith such a fundamental imbalance of power, a contract fixing the 
terms of the relationship so as to benefit the dominant party will be 
253. See generally Brudney, Dividends, Discretion, and Disclosure, 66 VA. L. REV. 85 
( 1980 ) ;  and Fischel, The Law and Economics of Div,:dend Policy, 67 VA. L. REv. 699 ( 1981 ) .  
254 . See Anderson, supra note 1 ,  a t  759-60. 
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inherently suspect. Since the existence of a fiduciary relationship 
also tends to imply that market controls will not deter overreaching 
by the dominant party, one cannot look to market controls to re­
strain overreaching by the contract's drafter. 
But, thus stated, the general case for avoiding contract terms 
conflicting with fiduciary duties begins to state a case against grant­
ing fiduciary protections to convertible bondholders in the first 
place. None of these general justifications for fiduciary avoidance of 
contract terms fully apply here. Furthermore, under a regime of 
bondholder protective contract interpretation, contract avoidance 
is the sole practical function which a bondholder fiduciary duty 
could perform. The standard form bond contract, as protectively 
construed by the courts, would provide an authoritative source of all 
of the relationship's terms, incidentally achieving all of the gap-fill­
ing efficiencies which fiduciary duties bring to other corporate 
relationships.  
Under this functional analysis, the case for making an issuer 
duty to convertible bondholders a strict fiduciary duty, comparable 
to that of an agent to its principal, becomes a restatement of the case 
for avoiding convertible bond contract terms. Like the avoidance 
case, the fiduciary case is more or less compelling depending on the 
bondholder in view. We see the less compelling case by focusing on 
the well-informed bondholders. They neither lack knowledge nor de­
pend on the issuer. We see a more persuasive case if we focus on the 
uninformed bondholders. But, despite the change in doctrinal con­
text, the practical matters at stake remain precisely the matters at 
stake with contract law avoidance . 2 5 5  The same considerations con­
tinue to counsel respect for the integrity of the bond contract. 
To sum up, let us return to the case of the issuer's investment 
and dividend policy, and assume that the issuer owes a primary fidu­
ciary duty to the bondholders. Under the above ana.lysis the issuer 
nevertheless should be free to declare cash dividends for the stock­
holders' benefit because the bond contract amounts to a waiver of 
the bondholder's  rights as beneficiaries of the duty and no compel­
ling justification for avoiding the waiver exists. If we change as­
sumptions and make the stockholder duty the primary one, it re­
mains equally difficult to see how a dividend could violate the duty 
to the bondholders. And even if the bond contract is silent about 
dividends, all matters relevant to a determination of whether the 
dividend harms a bondholder interest worthy of legal protection 
come to bear in the contract interpretation inquiry. Finally, if the 
255. See supra notes 216-2:3 and accompanying text. 
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relative priorities of  the bondholder and stockholder duties were left 
to case by case determination, we again find ourselves restating 
cases of bond contract interpretation and avoidance. Subordinating 
the duty to the bondholders would amount to the same thing as re­
fusing to avoid the contract. As with contract avoidance under con­
tract doctrine, the ultimate choice is between the bond contract and 
contrary judicial notions of fairness. 
b. Fiduciary duties vs. contract law duties 
Under the above analysis an issuer fiduciary duty to bondhold­
ers is indistinguishable from contract. interpretation informed by a 
good faith duty. 2 5 6 While the duties in theory originate in different 
places-the contract law duty in the particular contract's bundles of 
promises and conditions, and the fiduciary duty in the issuers' exer­
cise of judgment over the bondholders' investment-they become 
functionally identical so long as the bond contract is granted pri­
macy over judicial fairness notions as the source of the relationship's 
rights and duties. Both duties justify bondholder protective filling in 
of contractual interstices and perhaps a generalized duty to disclose, 
but do nothing more. 
Duplicative legal routes to the same destination, while untidy, 
hardly are unusual and often coexist without causing apparent 
harm. Perhaps the fiduciary route nevertheless ought to be closed off 
here because it creates an unnecessary risk of diverting judges to the 
wrong destination altogether. 
The convertible bond relationship presents an area of overlap 
between contract and fiduciary restraining principles. Outside of the 
overlap, contract and fiduciary duties go off in different directions, 
with fiduciary duties centering on protection of the dependent party 
and contract duties centering on the effectuation of the parties' allo­
cation of risks. Fiduciary duties such as those between attorney and 
client, partners, brokers and customers, and even management and 
corporation, tend to impose a higher degree of selflessness than is 
imposed on contracting parties subject to the good faith duty. In 
general, the fiduciary must put the beneficiary's interests ahead of 
his ov1n even though the costs to the fiduciary exceed the benefits to 
the beneficiary. In contrast, under a good faith approach the party 
under the duty need only give equal consideration to the other 
256. See supra notes 127-85 and accompanying text. 
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party's interests, placing them ahead of his own only where the bal­
ance of costs and benefits gives primacy to the other's interests. 2 5  7 
A court treating a contractual relationship too easily might be 
led to an erroneous avoidance of an unobjectionable contractual al­
location of risk, by a rhetoric of selflessness that originated regard­
ing very different fiduciary relationships. Such was the result in 
Zahn2 5 8 where the court's erroneous restraint of the exercise of call 
rights resulted from too strict a focus on fiduciary concerns. 
In sum, the strain of bending fiduciary principles to fit the con­
vertible bond context creates a risk of over-protecting bondholders. 
Since the results of the effort only duplicate results obtainable 
through contract law analysis, and since contract law provides a 
more precise set of analytical tools for resolving conflicts between 
issuers and bondholders, 2 5 9  the courts ought to abandon this partic­
ular experiment in fiduciary protection. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article examines judicial intervention in the convertible 
bond relationship to resolve issuer-bondholder conflicts, bringing to 
bear a detailed description of the relationship 's economic and con­
tractual structure. Three different doctrinal frameworks for judicial 
intervention are evaluated: contract interpretation, contract avoid­
ance and corporate fiduciary duty. 
Significant judicial intervention in the relationship occurs in the 
framework of contract interpretation due to residual imperfections 
in governing contract provisions. Interpreting judges employing 
neoclassical concepts of interpretation enj oy surprisingly wide dis­
cretion to make law for the relationship . This Article suggests that 
this discretion be restricted under a norm of bondholder protection. 
The norm is proposed as a moral response to the issuer opportunism 
and bondholder vulnerability underlying issuer-bondholder con­
flicts. Of course, economic theory-in particular the efficient mar-� 
kets point-implies a very different moral response. But, at least in 
the convertible bond context, the theory's moral force dissipates 
upon its application to complex real world relationships. Transac-
257. The distinction is derived from one drawn by Goetz & Scott, supra note 80, 
at 1 128. 
258. Zahn v. Transamerica Corp . ,  162 F.2d 36, 46 ( 3d Cir. 1947 ) .  
259. Cj. Chirelstein, supra note 129, at 2 1 0  ( suggesting that the standard fiduciary 
analytical tools-fair price, arms iength dealing and business purpose--are too indi�criminate 
to provide effective solutions to complex corporate problems and recommending federal legis­
lation as the only practicable solution ) .  
740 ·wiSCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
tion cost scrutiny similarly fails to yield a compelling result in this 
context . When inadequacies appear in contract provisions gov­
erning publicly issued bonds, real world costs and benefits lead to 
private solutions and render instrumentalist jurisprudence under 
the efficiency norm unnecessary. 
Aggressive judicial intervention in the relationship in the 
frameworks of contract avoidance and corporate fiduciary duty oc­
curs occasionally but persistently. Such intervention draws on the 
fiduciary rhetoric characterizing most judicial intervention against 
opportunism in corporate relationships. But such fiduciary rhetoric 
implies a norm of issuer selflessness potentially conflicting with the 
elaborate system of issuer restraints and issuer freedoms contained 
in bond contracts. The efficiency norm counsels against such costly 
conflict. Therefore, this Article suggests retreat to the less intense 
good faith rhetoric of contract law. 
